decentralized-autonomous-organization (DeOzn)
senso-concept-Mcs

McsHitp-creation:: {2019-05-05} {2017-03-28},

overview of DeOzn

description::
"A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is an organization that is run by rules that are created by their members through a consensus process and then written into a set of smart contracts that are run on the blockchain, thus enabling the automated management of a distributed organization."
[http://complexitylabs.io/distributed-organizations/]

name::
* McsEngl.McsTchInf000019.last.html//dirTchInf//dirMcs!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.dirMcs/dirTchInf/McsTchInf000019.last.html!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.DAC!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.DAO!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.Dac!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.Dao!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.Dao-(decentralized-autonomous-organization)!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.Dao-of--Dchain-net!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.Dchain-net'Dao!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.DeOzn, {2022-06-23},
* McsEngl.DeOzn-(McsTchInf000019)!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-(decentralized-autonomous-organization)!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.Dorg!⇒DeOzn, {2018-10-31},
* McsEngl.Dozn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-03-11},
* McsEngl.Dto!⇒DeOzn, {2018-04-24},
* McsEngl.Oto!⇒DeOzn, {2019-06-25},
* McsEngl.autonomous-cooperative!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-09},
* McsEngl.autonomous-trust--ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-06-23},
* McsEngl.collaborative-autonomous-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.d-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.da-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-31},
* McsEngl.decentralized-autonomous-corporation-(Dac)!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.decentralized-autonomous-entity-(Dae)!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.decentralized-autonomous-organization-(Dao)!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.decentralized-chain-based-organization!⇒DeOzn,
* McsEngl.decentralized-organization!⇒DeOzn, {2018-10-31},
* McsEngl.decentralized-trust-organization!⇒DeOzn, {2018-04-24},
* McsEngl.digital-cooperative!⇒DeOzn, [literature]
* McsEngl.non-antagonistic-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-06-01},
* McsEngl.oznDa!⇒DeOzn, {2020-10-21},
* McsEngl.participative-autonomous-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.self-organizing-autonomous-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.smart-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.synagonism-ogn!⇒DeOzn, {2019-06-01},
* McsEngl.Đ-chain-Dao!⇒DeOzn,
====== langoGreek:
* McsElln.αυτόνομα-διοικούμενος-οργανισμός!=DeOzn, {2019-05-15},

descriptionLong::
Organization is a-system-of-humans with an-administering-system.
IF it has-no administering-system, it is a-GROUP.
No humans, no group, no organization, no Dao.
A-blockchain-network only if it will add an-administering-system is becoming organization.
Bitcoin, Ethereum networks do-not have such a-system and have a-tendency to split.
BitShares clearly states in its whitepaper that it is a-Dao-company (as it runs for profit).
"BitShares is a decentralized autonomous company, and as such offers products to earn their shareholders a profit.
As we have seen in the previous section, it also offers a way to pay for expense, such as development and administration but earns a profit by burnning (i.e. reducing supply).
Of course, the company can only be profitable if the income exceeds the expenses.
Thus, we will now discuss both in detail". [idBtswpr4]
A-Dao RUNS autonomously.
It evolves with decentralized-decision-making.
[hmnSngo.2017-03-29]
===
IF a-bcnnet incorporates (= buildin) a-decentralized-autonomous-governing-system
THEN it is-becoming a-Dao (decentralized-Autonomous-Organization).
[hmnSngo.2017-05-06]
===
"DAC is an acronym for a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation (or Decentralized Autonomous Community). This is similar to a co-op, as it is a member-run Corporation, which is self-governing, and can function autonomously. The entire business logic of a DAC is encoded into a smart contract that resides on the blockchain. Also known as a DAO - Decentralized Autonomous Organization."
[https://www.eoscanada.com/en/abc-eos]
===
"A DAO can be summed up as an organization of people who communicate with each other via a “network protocol,” which is to say that they communicate with one another via a ruleset."
[https://www.dash.org/forum/threads/how-does-the-dash-dao-work.9560/]
===
The proof-of-work structure that secures and maintains the Bitcoin network is one manner of organizing individuals who do not necessarily trust one another to act in the best interest of all participants of the network.
[http://docs.bitshares.eu/bitshares/whatis.html#consensus-technology]
===
"the current system (rule of law) makes room for the new system (rule of code)"
[https://github.com/aragon/nest/issues/48]
===
"A DAO is a self-organizing entity, and at large better resembles an organism rather than an organization."
[https://daostack.io/wp/DAOstack-White-Paper-en.pdf]

01_node of DeOzn

stakeholder of DeOzn

description::
· stakeholder is any human-entity (human, human-group, human-organization) or Dchain-account RELATED to a-DeOzn.
[hmnSngo.2019-05-24]
===
· stakeholder is any human or human-organization RELATED to a-Dorg.
[hmnSngo.2018-11-29]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'stakeholder,

stakeholder.SPECIFIC

specific::
* account-stakeholder,
* accountNo-stakeholder,
===
* internal-stakeholder,
* internalNo-stakeholder,
===
* contractor,
* contributor,
* customer,
* developer,
* governor,
* human-entity,
* user,

stakeholder.HUMAN-ENTITY

description::
· human-entity is a-human-(individual) or a-human-group of a-human-organization.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-stakeholder.human-entity,
* McsEngl.human-entity--DeOzn-stakeholder,

specific::
* human-(individual),
* human-group,
* human-organization,

stakeholder.HUMAN

description::
· a unique human.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-stakeholder.human,

stakeholder.ACCOUNT

description::
· account-stakeholder is a-stakeholder which is a-Dchain-account which holds the-governance-token of the-DeOzn.
· this account is-managed by any human-entity.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-stakeholder.account,
* McsEngl.account-stakeholder--of-DeOzn,

stakeholder.ACCOUNT.NO

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-stakeholder.accountNo,

specific::
* human,
* human-group,
* human-organization,

stakeholder.GOVERNOR

description::
· governor is the-stakeholder who governs the-DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'governor,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'stakeholder.governor,
* McsEngl.governor-of-DeOzn,

stakeholder.CONTRIBUTOR

description::
· member-of-Dorg is any stakeholder that MAKES UP (undefined!) the-Dorg.
[hmnSngo.2019-06-02]
· member-of-Dorg is any human or human-organization that MAKE UP the-Dorg.
[hmnSngo.2018-11-03]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'contributor!⇒DeOzn-member,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'internal-stakeholder!⇒DeOzn-member,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'member!⇒DeOzn-member,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'stakeholder.internal!⇒DeOzn-member,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-member,

member.SPECIFIC

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-mermber.specific,

specific::
=== specifics-division-on-ownership:
* owner,
* ownerNo,
=== specifics-division-on-work:
* worker,
* workerNo,

member.OWNER

description::
·

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'employer,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'owner,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-member.owner,

member.OWNER.NO

description::
· employee is a-member-(contributor) with no ownership in the-DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'employee,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'ownerNo,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-member.ownerNo,

member.WORKER

description::
·

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'worker,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-member.worker,

member.WORKER.NO

description::
·

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'workerNo,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-member.workerNo,

stakeholder.CONTRIBUTOR.NO

description::
· contributorNo is a-customer or a-supplier.
[hmnSngo.2019-06-15]
===
· external-stakeholder is a-stakeholder who has no saying in the-governace-system of the-DeOzn [2019-06-15].
[hmnSngo.2019-04-04]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'external-stakeholder,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'memberNo-stakeholder,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'stakeholder.external,

specific::
=== specifics-division-on-buying
* customer,
* supplier,
===
* contractor,

memberNo.CUSTOMER

description::
· customer is a-human-entity that BUYS the-product-of-the-DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'customer,

memberNo.SUPPLIER

description::
· supplier is a-human-entity that SELLS input-goods-and-services to a-DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'supplier,

specific::
* contractor,
* outsourcer,

stakeholder.CONTRACTOR

description::
· contractor is a-human or human-organization appointed to accomplish the-goals of DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'contractor,

asset of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.asset-of-DeOzn,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'asset,

governance-Dasset of DeOzn (link)

revenue of DeOzn

description::
· input funds.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'revenue,

expenditure of DeOzn

description::
· output funds.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'expenditure,

profit of DeOzn

description::
· profit = reveneu - expenditure

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'profit,
* McsEngl.profit-of-DeOzn,

output-satisfier of DeOzn

description::
· the-good or service the-organization outputs.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'output-asset!⇒DeOzn-product,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'output-satisfier!⇒DeOzn-product,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'product!⇒DeOzn-product,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-product,

input-satisfier of DeOzn

description::
· any good-or-service a-DeOzn buys from external-stakeholders.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'input-satisfier,

governance of DeOzn

description::
· a-DeOzn must have a-governance-system.
· if not it is not an-organization but a-group.
[hmnSngo.2019-04-03]
===
"Decentralized governance is the field of protocols that coordinate large number of agents into a collective action, implemented with smart contracts on the blockchain. It is also the basis for decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)."
[https://medium.com/daostack/holographic-consensus-part-1-116a73ba1e1c]

name::
* McsEngl.Dgovernance-service.organization!⇒DeOzn-govc,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'governance-system!⇒DeOzn-govc,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-governance!⇒DeOzn-govc,

algorithm of govc

description::
· a-DeOzn operates on rules stored on a-Dchain.
· members submit proposals, then vote on them, with a proposal passing if a majority of members vote yes.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'algorithm,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'code,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'smart-contract,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'algorithm,

Dchain-net of DeOzn

description::
· the-Dchain-net on which the-DeOzn has-stored its management-rules and issued its management-token.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'Dchain-net,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'hosting--Dchain-net,

Dasset of govc

description::
"With the help of tokens, DAO participants acquire the ownership of a share in a decentralized organization – by analogy with the securities in the traditional financial world."
[https://newconomy.media/analytics/all-you-wanted-to-know-about-newconomy-dao-club/]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'Dasset-of-governance,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'governance-token,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'token,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'token,
* McsEngl.governance-token--of-DeOzn,

proposal of govc

description::
· members submit proposals, then vote on them, with a proposal passing if a majority of members vote yes.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'proposal,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'proposal,

automation-degree of govc

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'automation,

decentralization of govc

description::
· decentralization of power.
· empowering its members.
· decentralization-of-Dorg is THE-CONTROL of the-org by ALL its members.
===
"In the past, large groups of people have typically relied on top-down leadership, as in companies with CEOs, or militaries with generals.
These systems can work to foster coherent collaboration, but they’re disaster-prone: if the captain steers into an iceberg, whether it’s because he’s incompetent or corrupt, the whole ship goes down.
Decentralized leadership frees organizations from this concentrated failure point, but it can multiply inefficiency: the more voices you try to include in decision-making, the noisier and slower things can become."
[DAOstack newsletter]
[hmnSngo.2018-11-03]
===
"The larger the network, the harder it is for decisions to reflect all members’ views.
Good decentralized governance scales to millions while making decisions that accurately represent the group."
[https://daostack.io/deck/DAOstack-Deck-en.pdf]

name::
* McsEngl.decentralization-of-Dorg,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'cooperation,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'decentralization,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'self-organization,

collective-attention of govc

description::
"Monetization of attention allows a decentralized, wider decision-making process, while protecting it from abuse and maintaining resilience in the network."
[https://medium.com/daostack/decentralized-governance-first-principles-1fc6eaa492ed]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'collective-attention,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'voter-apathy,
* McsEngl.collective-attention--of--DeOzn-governance,

scalability of govc

description::
"The possibility of thousands, and millions, of people to make decisions together, quickly and wisely."
[https://medium.com/daostack/decentralized-governance-first-principles-1fc6eaa492ed]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'scalability-of-governance,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'scalability,

transparency-degree of govc

description::
· pro: everything happens online.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'transparency,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'transparency-of-governance,

accountability of govc

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'accountability-of-governance,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'accountability,

responsiveness of govc

description::
"reacting quickly and positively."
[Google dictionary]
===
"Decentralized leadership frees organizations from this concentrated failure point, but it can multiply inefficiency: the more voices you try to include in decision-making, the noisier and slower things can become."
[DAOstack]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'responsiveness-of-governance,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'responsiveness,

effectiveness of govc

description::
"successful in producing a desired or intended result."
[Google dictionary]
===
"DAOs will replace the existing corporate structures not because they are nicer or more moral, but rather simply since they will be far more effective."
[{2018-04-22} https://daostack.io/wp/DAOstack-White-Paper-en.pdf]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'effectiveness-of-governance,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'effectiveness,

efficiency of govc

description::
"achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense."
[Google dictionary]
===
"Decentralized leadership frees organizations from this concentrated failure point, but it can multiply inefficiency: the more voices you try to include in decision-making, the noisier and slower things can become."
[DAOstack]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'efficiency-of-governance,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'efficiency,

governing of govc

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'governing,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'governing,

specific::
* off-chain,
* on-chain,
===
* creating,
* budgeting,
* voting,

creating-DeOzn of govc

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'creating,

voting of govc

description::
"10 - Is voter fraud easier when voters vote by mobile phone? How does blockchain technology enables incorruptible decision-making?
The advances on crypthography and distributed ledger technology enable incorruptible decision-making because after a vote is registered it can never be altered, making virtual blockchain-based votes immensely superior to analogue votes in terms of fraud prevention. Additionally, this technology enables all members of the organization to audit the votes."
[https://github.com/DemocracyEarth/paper/blob/master/FAQ/FAQ-en.md]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'voting,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-govc'voting,

addressWpg::
* {2019-03-25} Adam-Levi, https://medium.com/daostack/reputation-vs-tokens-6d7642c7a538,

specific::
* account-voting,
===
* reputation-voting,
* token-voting,

space of DeOzn

description::
· a-DeOzn is global.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'space,

tool of DeOzn

description::
· computer-programs (mainly Dapps) used in the-management of DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'tool,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-tool,

evaluation of DeOzn

description::
As some have already come to recognize the blockchain is much more than just another internet technology it is an institutional technology that has the potential to reshape how we structure organizations. As it matures in the coming decade or two it will add a whole new layer on top of the internet that will enable collaboration like never before. Whereas Web 2.0 gave us the tools for mass distributed collaboration - and in so doing created the internet that we know today operated by large platform companies, half centralized, half distributed - the blockchain will take this model a step further as it will remove the requirement for the centralized institutional layer that currently runs these platforms. In so doing it has the potential to enable the emergence of fully distributed organizations, that will be automated, dynamic and fluid.
This being said, we still have a long way to go - before these could be truly scaled - both on the technical level, in designing these new forms of self-organizing social organizations, and also on the cultural level of people becoming more comfortable with giving over responsibility, authority and control to automated software systems without centralized human regulation. And there is good reason to be cautious in this process, large automated computer systems can be powerful tools and social fabric can be a delicate thing. Human oversight, intuition, and foresight should continue to play an important role in the management of these platforms until our understanding and technology are mature enough to take over the running of critical management functions.
[http://complexitylabs.io/distributed-organizations/]

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'evaluation,

addressWpg::
* {2013-11-02} Daniel-Larimer, DAC Revisited: https://letstalkbitcoin.com/dac-revisited,
* {2016-05-16} Daniel-Larimer, Is The DAO going to be DOA?: https://steemit.com/crypto-news/@dan/,

benefit of DeOzn

description::
· no single point of control, or failure.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'evaluation.benefit!⇒DeOzn-benefit,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-benefit,

problem of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'evaluation.problem!⇒DeOzn-problem,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-problem,

specific::
* collective-attention,
* effectiveness-of-governance,
* efficiency-of-governance,
* responsiveness-of-governance,
* scalability-of-governance,
* transparency-of-governance,

law of DeOzn

description::
· the-legal-status of DeOzns is not clear.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'law!⇒DeOzn-law,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-law,

info-resource of law of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-law'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* Blockchain Based LLC: http://law.mit.edu/BBLLC,
* https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/11/025/04173,
===
* {2021-07-20} https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/crypto-daos-and-the-wyoming-frontier-9251606/,
* {2019-06} https://www.gravelshea.com/2019/06/dorg-launches-first-limited-liability-dao/,
* {2018-05-31} Stan-Higgins, Vermont Governor Signs Bill Clearing Way for Blockchain Companies, https://www.coindesk.com/vermontdao-state-governor-signs-bill-clearing-way-blockchain-companies,

organization of DeOzn

DAOincubator of DeOzn

description::
"The DAOincubator is a group of builders, researchers, designers and specialists dedicated to making today’s DAOs more functional and deploying these entities in the service of previously unexplored use cases."
[http://daoincubator.org/]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOincubator,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'DAOincubator,

info-resource of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'resource!⇒DeOzn-resource,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-resource,

addressWpg::
* {2022-06-23} https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/06/are-dao-the-business-structures-of-the-future/,
* {2021-07-06} https://blog.aragon.org/15-ways-the-world-is-being-transformed-by-daos/,
* {2019-02-01} https://steemit.com/dac/@eosdac/tutorial-launching-your-own-dac-on-the-jungle-test-network-with-eosdac,
* {2019-01-28} Eric-Gorski, https://blog.gnosis.pm/2019-is-the-year-of-the-dao-5a428f90fb55,
* {2018-11-28} Stefano-Bernardi, Decentralized organizations are the future: why I’m joining Aragon, https://medium.com/@stefanobernardi/decentralized-organizations-are-the-future-why-im-joining-aragon-52ddd339ed2e,
* {2018-11-22} Jorge-Izquierdo and Ramón-Recuero, https://blog.aragon.one/the-future-of-organizations/,
* {2018-10-30} Aragon 0.6 is live on Mainnet, https://blog.aragon.org/aragon-06-is-live-on-mainnet/,
* {2018-10-23} Max-Semenchuk, What is Distributed Governance? https://medium.com/dgov/what-is-distributed-governance-3b103eb082c0,
* {2018-06-18} Andrew-Furmanczyk, What is a DAC? - Explained, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=54&v=ahoFGzxE_NY,
* {2018-02-06} Field.Matan, Decentralized Governance Matters, https://medium.com/daostack/decentralized-governance-first-principles-1fc6eaa492ed,
* {2016-05-31} Ralph C. Merkle: Daos, Democracy and Governance: http://merkle.com/papers/DaodemocracyDraft.pdf,
* {2016-05-27} Dino-Mark, Vlad-Zamfir, Emin-Gün-Sirer, http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/,
* {2013-09-19} Vitalik Buterin: Bootstrapping A Decentralized Autonomous Corporation: Part I: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bootstrapping-a-decentralized-autonomous-corp.../
===
* https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/article/a-complete-overview-of-the-daos-ecosystem,
* https://aragon.one/,
* https://docs.bisq.network/user-dao-intro.html,
* What if the blockchain's killer app was governance? https://klsn.io/,
* https://dgov.foundation/,
* http://daoresearchfoundation.org/,

website of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'website,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-resource'website,

community-channel of DeOzn

description::
· any means used the-humans involved to communicate.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn-resource'community-channel,
* McsEngl.DeOzn-resource'community-engagement-tool,
* McsEngl.community-channel--of-DeOzn,

specific::
* email,
* newsletter,
* website,
* Discord,
* Disqus,
* Dropbox,
* Facebook,
* Github,
* Google-Docs,
* Instagram,
* Reddit,
* Slack,
* Telegram,
* Twitter,
* YouTube,
* Whatsapp,

ENVIRONMENT of DeOzn

relation-to-coop of DeOzn

description::
· programmatic-governance is the main difference DeOzn and existing cooperatives.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'relation-to-cooperative,

DOING of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'doing,

specific::
* creating,
* functing,
* governing,
* accounting,
* predicting,
* proposing,
* staking,

main-function of DeOzn

description::
· the-function of a-DeOzn that creates its good-or-service, the reason for its existence.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'functing!⇒DeOzn--main-function,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'main-function!⇒DeOzn--main-function,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'mission!⇒DeOzn--main-function,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'purpose!⇒DeOzn--main-function,
* McsEngl.DeOzn'service!⇒DeOzn--main-function,
* McsEngl.DeOzn--main-function,

accounting of DeOzn

description::
· the-process of keeping financial-accounts of the-DeOzn.

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'accounting,

evoluting of DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn'evoluting,

{2019-05-05}::
=== file Mcs creation:
· I have-created this concept as file-Mcs from part of Dchain.

{2016-06}::
* McsEngl.{2016-06}-TheDAO-hack,
"The DAO was crowdfunded via a token sale in May 2016. It set the record for the largest crowdfunding campaign in history.
In June 2016, hackers exploited a vulnerability in the DAO code to enable them to siphon off one third of The DAO's funds to a subsidiary account.
On the 20th July 2016, the Ethereum community decided to hard-fork the Ethereum blockchain to restore virtually all funds to the original contract. This was controversial, and led to a fork in Ethereum, where the original unforked blockchain was maintained as Ethereum Classic, thus breaking Ethereum into two separate active cryptocurrencies."
[{2019-05-27} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_DAO_(organization)]

GENERIC of DeOzn

generic-tree::
* human-organization,
...
* entity,

DeOzn.SPECIFIC

name::
* McsEngl.DeOzn.specific,

specific::
* blockchain-DeOzn,
* Dagchain-DeOzn,
=== on Dchain-net:
* Bitshares-DeOzn,
* BOScoin-DeOzn,
* Dash-DeOzn,
* Dfinity-DeOzn,
* EOS-DeOzn,
* Ethereum-DeOzn,
* Tezos-DeOzn,
* Wings-DeOzn,
=== on platform:
* Aragon-DeOzn: https://aragon.one/,
* DAOstack-DeOzn: https://daostack.io/,

specific::
* MakerDAO,
* eosDAC,

DeOzn.BLOCKCHAIN

name::
* McsEngl.blockchain-Decentralized-Autonomous-Organization,
* McsEngl.blockchain-Dao,
* McsEngl.DeOzn.blockchain,

DeOzn.Democracy-Earth-Foundation

description::
· a-DeOzn created with Democracy-Earth-Foundation's tools.

name::
* McsEngl.Def-DeOzn,,
* McsEngl.Democracy-Earth-Foundation--DeOzn!⇒Def-DeOzn,
* McsEngl.DeOzn.Democracy-Earth-Foundation!⇒Def-DeOzn,

Democracy-Earth-Foundation of Def-DeOzn

description::
"In a world that has succeeded in the globalization of financial assets while keeping political rights enclosed to territories, we need to build new models of democratic governance that enable humanity to collaborate and address pressing global issues. Democracy Earth Foundation is building free, open source software for incorruptible blockchain-based decision-making (voting) within institutions of all sizes, from the most local involving two people to the most global involving all of us. Uneven distribution of opportunity around the globe due to the perpetual confrontation between national governments has led to accelerated climate change, rising inequality, terrorism and forced migrations. Democracy Earth Foundation considers that the technology stack that includes Bitcoin as programmable money without Central Banks, and Ethereum enabling smart contracts without the need of Judiciary Courts, requires a new layer that signals incorruptible votes beyond the territorial boundaries of Nation-States. This transnational network will act in accordance with the personal sovereignty of its members and protect their human rights with encryption. In our Initial Rights Offering we offer a token called vote that will grant participation rights to every human with decision-making as its main function. Our proposal introduces cryptographically induced equality: as long as any person is able to validate his or her self-sovereign identity, they will receive a corresponding share of votes that is equal to the share of every active participant in the network. We define a Proof of Identity process that avoids central authority by introducing the concept of attention mining which incentivizes participants to strengthen the trust of votes by performing simple tests aimed at detecting replicants. Finally votes get dripped to valid participants under a Universal Basic Income mechanism with a goal of finding a proper equilibrium in the historical tension between money and politics. We seek nothing less than true democratic governance for the Internet age, one of the foundational building blocks of an achievable global peace and prosperity arising from an arc of technological innovations that will change what it means to be human on Earth."
[https://github.com/DemocracyEarth/paper]

name::
* McsEngl.Democracy-Earth-Foundation,

info-resource of Def-DeOzn

name::
* McsEngl.Def-DeOzn'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://democracy.earth/,
* https://github.com/DemocracyEarth/paper,
* https://github.com/DemocracyEarth/paper/blob/master/FAQ/FAQ-en.md,
===
* {2018-11-16} https://words.democracy.earth/testnet-democracy-earth-is-live-129fd68d27f0,

DeOzn.Ethereum

description::
· Deth-DeOzn is a-DeOzn on the-Ethereum-network.
===
DAO is a-very-confused-concept.
The-fiasko of 'THE-DAO' is-not-unrelated with it.
DAO is an-entity very young and not yet stable.
Naturaly the-concept of a-DAO is double fluid.
A-DAO is an-organization, and an-organization has humans.
A-DAO is autonomous in the-sense that its managing-rules run autonomously as the-members have-set them and not as an-individual thinks.
Ethereum-smart-contracs COULD become the-managing-rules.
But "everything flows" and the-managing-rules must change and be-improved by the-human-members in a-decentralized-manner.
Then the-dao must-have builtin a-decentralized-governance-system.
Here I present the-dapp of a-DAO which COULD run autonomously the-managing-rules. {2019-03-31},
[hmnSngo.2017-04-20]
===
A DAO is purely software: in itself it does not have the capabilities to manufacture a product, write code, develop hardware or sweep the streets.
It requires actors in the physical world for this purpose, called Contractors.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]
===
The term decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is often used in the same breath as "smart contract" or "blockchain".
DAOs are touted as a new form of legal structure in which ownership, management and control are automated and human involvement is limited or removed, based on a previously agreed upon set of rules.
[ http://www.coindesk.com/how-to-sue-a-decentralized-autonomous-organization/]

name::
* McsEngl.DAO.Ethereum!⇒DoEth,
* McsEngl.Deth-DeOzn!⇒DoEth, {2019-03-31},
* McsEngl.DoEth, {2019-06-16},
* McsEngl.DeOzn.Ethereum!⇒DoEth,
* McsEngl.Ethereum-DAO!⇒DoEth,
* McsEngl.Ethereum-DeOzn!⇒DoEth,
* McsEngl.decentralized-autonomous-organization-of-Ethereum!⇒DoEth,

stakeholder of DoEth

member of DoEth

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth'member,
* McsEngl.DoEth'participant,

contractor of DoEth

description::
A DAO stores ether and other Ethereum based tokens and transmits them based on the DAO’s code.
It does not do much else.
It cannot build a product, write code or develop hardware.
It requires a “Contractor” to accomplish these and other goals.
A DAO selects a Contractor by accepting a Contractor’s proposal.
[https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf]
===
A DAO is purely software: in itself it does not have the capabilities to manufacture a product, write code, develop hardware or sweep the streets.
It requires actors in the physical world for this purpose, called Contractors.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]

proposal of DoEth

description::
Contractors submit Proposals for the development of product or services -- these take the form of smart contracts backed by plain English descriptions. To guarantee the Contractors will not act against the interest of the DAO, a group of signatories validates Contractors’ Proposals then add them to the list of addresses authorized to receive ether (ETH) from the DAO.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]

curator of DoEth

description::
Contractors submit Proposals for the development of product or services -- these take the form of smart contracts backed by plain English descriptions. To guarantee the Contractors will not act against the interest of the DAO, a group of signatories validates Contractors’ Proposals then add them to the list of addresses authorized to receive ether (ETH) from the DAO.
This group of signatories is collectively referred to as a Curator. To maintain decentralization, the Curator can be fired by the DAO at any time and for any reason.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]

token of DoEth

description::
Would-be participants in the DAO can for a period of time acquire DAO tokens by sending ETH to a DAO. These tokens will give them the right to vote on Proposals (proportional to the number of tokens acquired) as well the opportunity to receive rewards generated by the output of the work from the Contractors’ Proposals.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth'token,

code of DoEth

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth'contract,
* McsEngl.DoEth'smart-contract,

law of DoEth

description::
A word of caution, at the outset: the legal status of DAOs remains the subject of active and vigorous debate and discussion.
Not everyone shares the same definition.
[https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf]

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth'law,

security of DoEth

description::
We are making the generic DAO model we developed free and open source, so it can be reused by anyone wishing to put together a transparent organization where governance and decision making systems are immutably programmed in the Blockchain. This code been reviewed by hundreds of pairs of eyes from our community and by one of the most respected auditing companies in the world, Deja Vu.
This standard DAO framework is simple, decentralized and 100% secure.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth'security,

info-resource of DoEth

addressWpg::
* https://ethereum.org/dao,
* http://www.coindesk.com/how-to-sue-a-decentralized-autonomous-organization/
* {2014-05-06} Vitalik-Buterin: DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide: https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/
===
* https://slock.it/dao.html,
* code: https://github.com/slockit/DAO/
* https://github.com/FelixA/DAOhub,
===
* {2016-05-01+7} White Paper, due out next week,
* {2016-05-03} Stephan Tual
Slock.it Founder, Blockchain and Smart Contract Expert, Former CCO Ethereum
Mar 3, 2016 Unlisted
A Primer to Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)
https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd,
* {2016-05-01} Stephan Tual
Slock.it Founder, Blockchain and Smart Contract Expert, Former CCO Ethereum
Mar 1, 2016 Unlisted
DAOs, or how to Replace Obsolete Governance Models
https://blog.slock.it/daos-or-how-to-replace-both-the-kickstarter-and-token-presale-models-1b2b8898d6e7#.u8cp2obe5,

resource.whitepaper of DoEth

addressWpg::
* https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf,

DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE
FINAL DRAF - UNDER REVIEW
CHRISTOPH JENTZSCH
FOUNDER & CTO, SLOCK.IT
CHRISTOPH.JENTZSCH@SLOCK.IT

Abstract

This paper describes the first implementation of Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) code to automate organizational governance and decision-making.
The code can be used by individuals working together collaboratively outside of a traditional corporate form.
It can also be used by a registered corporate entity to automate formal governance rules contained in corporate bylaws or imposed by law.
First the DAO concept is described, then minority rights is discussed, and a solution to a “robbing the minority” attack vector is proposed.
Finally, a practical implementation of a first generation DAO entity is provided using smart contracts written in Solidity on the Ethereum blockchain.

1. Introduction

Corporate entities of all kinds are governed by rules that describe permitted and proscribed conduct.
These rules may exist as private contracts (like bylaws or shareholder agreements) between corporate owners.
They may also be imposed by law in addition to or in the absence of a written agreement between participants.

Historically, corporations have only been able to act through people (or through corporate entities that were themselves ultimately controlled by people).
This presents two simple and fundamental problems.
Whatever a private contract or public law require: (1) people do not always follow the rules and (2) people do not always agree what the rules actually require.
Collaboration without a corporate form does not solve these problems, necessarily, and it may introduce others.
In the absence of a corporate form, an explicit written agreement is substituted for unclear informal “understandings” and the legal protections provided by a corporate form will not be available.

Rule-breaking within an organization not always obvious, and motives may not matter to stakeholders once their money has been lost.
While bad behavior may make a corporation or its management civilly or criminally liable, punishment can come as little comfort to an investor who has already lost their money.

Crowdfunding (Massolution [2015]) amplifies the problem.
On the one hand, it has made it easier for small contributors to invest in large projects, and it has also made it possible for entrepreneurs to receive financial support that might not have been easily available in the past.
On the other hand, small investors remain vulnerable to financial mismanagement or outright fraud, and because they have a small stake in a venture, they may lack power to identify problems, participate in governance decisions, or to easily recover their investment (Knibbs [2015], Biggs [2015]).
At the same time, corporate leadership and management may be accused of malfeasance or mismanagement when they believe that they have acted in good faith, based on their understanding of their obligations and interpretation of applicable rules.

This paper presents a potential solution using Ethereum, (Buterin [2013], Wood [2014]) a blockchain technology which integrates a Turing complete programming language with smart contract processing functionality.
This paper illustrates a method that for the first time allows the creation of organizations in which (1) participants maintain direct real-time control of contributed funds and (2) governance rules are formalized, automated and enforced using software.
Specifically, standard smart contract code (Szabo [1997], Miller [1997]) has been written that can be used to form a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) on the Ethereum blockchain.
This paper explains how a DAO’s code works, focusing on some basic formation and governance features, including structure, creation and voting rights.

First a DAO’s Creation Phase and basic functionality are described.
Then minority owner rights are discussed and a solution to the “Majority Robbing the Minority Attack” problem is proposed: the “DAO split.”
The smart contract code is then explored in detail, and conclude with an explanation and detailed specification of the “DAO split.”

The code for the smart contracts is located at: https://github.com/slockit/DAO/

A word of caution, at the outset: the legal status of DAOs remains the subject of active and vigorous debate and discussion.
Not everyone shares the same definition.
Some have said that they are autonomous code and can operate independently of legal systems; others have said that they must be owned or operate by humans or human created entities.
There will be many uses cases, and the DAO code will develop over time.
Ultimately, how a DAO functions and its legal status will depend on many factors, including how DAO code is used, where it is used, and who uses it.
This paper does not speculate about the legal status of DAOs worldwide.
This paper is not intended to offer legal advice or conclusions.
Anyone who uses DAO code will do so at their own risk.

2. Dao Concept

DAO code is written in the “Solidity” programming language.
A DAO is activated by deployment on the Ethereum blockchain.

Once deployed, a DAO’s code requires “ether” to engage in transactions on Ethereum.
Ether is the digital fuel that powers the Ethereum network.
Without ether, a DAO can not do anything so a DAO’s first order of business is to receive ether.
After a DAO’s code is deployed, ether may be sent to the DAO’s smart contract address during an initial Creation Phase which is defined in the DAO’s code.

In exchange for ether, a DAO’s code creates tokens that are assigned to the account of the person who sent the ether.
The token grants its holder voting and ownership rights.
The number of tokens created is proportional to the amount of ether transferred.
Token price varies over time (see section 5).
Token ownership is freely transferable on the Ethereum blockchain, when the Creation Phase has ended.

A minimum DAO Creation goal and Creation Phase time-period are set as parameters in a DAO’s code at the time of deployment.
If the minimum DAO Creation goal is not reached at the close of the Creation Phase, all ether is returned.
After the Creation Phase has ended, the total ether raised is denoted by Ξraised and the total amount of tokens created is denoted by Ttotal.

A DAO stores ether and other Ethereum based tokens and transmits them based on the DAO’s code.
It does not do much else.
It cannot build a product, write code or develop hardware.
It requires a “Contractor” to accomplish these and other goals.
A DAO selects a Contractor by accepting a Contractor’s proposal.

Any DAO Token Holder may become a Contractor by submitting proposals to use a DAO’s ether, denoted by Ξtransfer.
If a proposal is approved, the DAO transmits ether to a smart contract representing the proposed project.
Such smart contracts can be parameterized and enable a DAO to interact with and influence the project it chose to support.
An example of such an agreement between a DAO and a project to be funded can be found in the appendix (A.4).

Members of a DAO cast votes weighted by the amount of tokens they control.
Tokens are divisible, indistinguishable and can easily be transferred between accounts.
Within the contracts, the individual actions of members, cannot be directly determined.
There is a set time frame tp to debate and vote on any given proposal.
In our example, this time frame is set by the creator of the proposal, and is required to be at least two weeks for a regular proposal.

After tp has passed, any token holder can call a function in the DAO contract that will verify that the majority voted in favor of the proposal and that quorum was reached; the function will execute the proposal if this is the case.
If this is not the case, the proposal will be closed.

The minimum quorum represents the minimum number of tokens required for a vote to be valid, is denoted by qmin, and calculated as follows:

(eqn.1)

Where d is the minQuorumDivisor.
This parameter’s default value is 5, but it will double in the case the quorum has not been met for over a year.
ΞDAO is the amount of ether owned by a DAO and RDAO is the amount of reward tokens owned by this DAO, as explained in section 7 (also see rewardToken in A.3).
The sum ΞDAO + RDAO is equal to the amount of ether used to Create DAO tokens plus the rewards received or said another way, the total amount of ether a DAO has ever received.

This means, initially, a quorum of 20% of all tokens is required for any proposal to pass.
In the event Ξtransfer equals the amount of ether a DAO has ever received, then a quorum of 53.33% is required.

In order to prevent “proposal spam,” a minimal deposit can be required to be paid when creating a proposal, which gets refunded if quorum is achieved.
If quorum is not achieved, the DAO keeps the proposal deposit.
The value of the proposal deposit can be changed from the default value by the DAO through another proposal.

3. Notation

Throughout this paper, Ξ always represents an amount of ether in its base unit wei.
This is defined as 1 Wei = 10^-18 Ether (Wood [2014]).
Similarly, DAO tokens are denoted with T and always represent the amount of DAO tokens in its base unit, defined as 10^-16 DAO token.

4. Majority robs minority attack

Minority owner rights can be a problem in any corporate form.
Minority rights may be protected or addressed by provisions in corporate governance documents or by statute or judge-made law.
But many of these solutions fail because minority owners may lack voting rights or the ability to “vote with their feet” and easily retrieve their capital.
This paper presents a solution to this problem in the DAO’s code.

A problem every DAO has to mitigate is the ability for the majority to rob the minority by changing governance and ownership rules after DAO formation.
For example, an attacker with 51% of the tokens, acquired either during the fueling period or created afterwards, could make a proposal to send all the funds to themselves.
Since they would hold the majority of the tokens, they would always be able to pass their proposals.

To prevent this, the minority must always have the ability to retrieve their portion of the funds.
Our solution is to allow a DAO to split into two.
If an individual, or a group of token holders, disagree with a proposal and want to retrieve their portion of the ether before the proposal gets executed, they can submit and approve a special type of proposal to form a new DAO.
The token holders that voted for this proposal can then split the DAO moving their portion of the ether to this new DAO, leaving the rest alone only able to spend their own ether.

This idea originates from a blog post by Vitalik Buterin (Buterin [2015]).

A problem this simple fix doesn’t address is voter apathy:
some token holders might not be actively involved in their DAO and might not follow proposals closely.
An attacker could use this to their advantage.
Even though the minority has the chance to retrieve their funds and split the DAO, some could be unaware of the situation and fail to act.
For a DAO to be considered safe, it is required that inactive token holders must also be protected from losing their ether.
Our proposed solution is implemented by limiting each individual DAO to a single Curator.
This Curator controls the list of addresses that can receive ether from the DAO, across all proposals.
This gives the Curator of a DAO considerable power.
To prevent the abuse of this power, it is possible for a DAO to vote for a new Curator, which may result in a split of the DAO as described above.

Any token holder can make a proposal to vote for a new Curator.
In effect, even a single token holder is able to both retrieve their remaining portion of ether and maintain their right to any future rewards associated to their previous contribution, as these will be sent to the new DAO automatically.
Rewards are defined as any ether received by a DAO generated from products the DAO funded so far and are explained in further detail in section 7.

The process of choosing a new Curator is as follows:
Any token holder can submit a proposal for a new Curator.
In this case, no proposal deposit is required, because an attacker could vote for an extremely high deposit, preventing any splits.
The debating period for this proposal is 7 days.
This is 7 days less than the minimum required for regular proposals, allowing anyone to retrieve their funds before a potentially malicious proposal goes through.
There is no quorum requirement, so that every token holder has the ability to split into their own DAO.
The debating period is used to discuss (on or off-chain) the new Curator and conduct a first vote that’s non-binding.
After this first vote, token holders can confirm its results or not.
In the case a majority opts to keep the original Curator, the minority can either keep the original Curator in order to avoid a split, or inversely they can confirm their vote for a new Curator and move their portion of the ether to a new DAO.

5. Token Price

DAO Token Creation rate decreases over time.
This reflects an assumption that early acts of DAO Creation have greater risk, as they may have less information about the potential success of the DAO and do not know whether what contribution will lead to full fueling of the DAO.
The DAO described in this paper has the following Creation schedule:

(eqn.2-3)

Here t is the unix time in seconds, tc is the closing time of the fueling period (see A.2 closingTime), w is a week in seconds and d a day in seconds.
Hence the number of tokens (in its base unit) each person Creates is calculated as: P(t)· Ξc.
Here Ξc stands for the amount of ether sent to fuel a DAO, denoted in wei.
This results in a constant Creation rate in the beginning, until 2 weeks before the end of the DAO Creation Phase.
At this time the amount of ether required to Create DAO tokens increases daily by 0.05 Ξc per base unit of DAO token.
Until 4 days before the closing time when there will be a constant Creation rate of 1.5 Ξc per base unit of DAO token.

Creation rate decreases during the Creation Phase could lead to a situation where a single contributor, having Created DAO tokens at the initial Creation rate, could split the DAO immediately after the Creation Phase ends, thereby receiving more ether than they put in due to other contributors having fueled a DAO at a higher Creation rate (Green [2016]).
In order to avoid that possibility, all ether that is used to fuel a DAO above the initial Creation rate, will be sent to an extra account.
Denoted as extraBalance in A.2.
This ether can be sent back to the DAO through a proposal after the DAO has spent at least this amount of ether.
This rule is implemented in the internal function isRecipientAllowed in section 6.3.

6. Contracts

This section will detail the smart contracts implementing the aforementioned concept.
The contracts are written in the programming language Solidity (Reitwiessner and Wood [2015]).
Each contract has member variables and functions which can be externally called by sending a transaction to the Ethereum network with the DAO contract address as the recipient and the method ID (optional with parameters) as data.
This section will discuss the meaning of the variables and the functions in detail.

The main contract is called ’DAO’.
It defines the inner workings of the DAO and it derives the member variables and functions from ’Token’ and ’TokenCreation’.
Token defines the inner workings of the DAO Token and TokenCreation defines how the DAO token is created by fueling the DAO with ether.
In addition to these three contracts, there is the ’ManagedAccount’ contract, which acts as a helper contract to store the rewards which are to be distributed to the token holders and the extraBalance (see section 5).
The contract ’SampleOffer’ (A.4) is an example of what a proposal from a contractor to the DAO could look like.

6.1. Token.

contract TokenInterface {
mapping (address => uint256) balances;
mapping (address => mapping (address => uint256)) allowed;
uint256 public totalSupply;
function balanceOf(address _owner) constant returns (uint256 balance);
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _amount) returns (bool success);
function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _amount) returns (bool success);
function approve(address _spender, uint256 _amount) returns (bool success);
function allowance(address _owner, address _spender) constant returns (uint256 remaining);
event Transfer(address indexed _from, address indexed _to, uint256 _amount);
event Approval(address indexed _owner, address indexed _spender, uint256 _amount);
}

Above is the interface of the Token contract.
The interfaces of these contracts are used in the text of this document to give a simple overview of the functions and variables used in the contract, the full implementation can be found in the appendix (A.1).
This contract represents the standard token as described here: https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Standardized_Contract_APIs, and the contract https://github.com/ConsenSys/Tokens/blob/master/Token_Contracts/contracts/Standard_Token.sol was used as a starting point for the contracts creation.

The map balances stores the number of DAO tokens which are controlled by an address.
All contracts which derive from TokenInterface can directly modify this map, but only 4 functions do so: createTokenProxy, transfer, transferFrom and splitDAO.

The map allowed is used to track the previously specified addresses that are allowed to send tokens on someone else’s behalf.

The integer totalSupply is the total number of DAO tokens in existence.
The public keyword creates a function with the same name as the variable which returns its value so that it is publically available.

The function balanceOf returns the balance of the specified address.

The function transfer is used to send token from the sender of the message to another address.

The function transferFrom is used to transfer tokens on behalf of someone else who has approved the transfer in advance using the approve function.

The function approve can be used by the DAO token owner to specify a certain spender to transfer a specified value from their account using the transferFrom function.
To check whether a certain address is allowed to spend DAO tokens on behalf of someone else, the allowance function can be used, which returns the number of tokens which can be spent by the spender.
This is similar to writing a check.

The event Transfer is used to inform lightweight clients about changes in balances.

The event Approval is used to inform lightweight clients about changes in allowed.

6.2. TokenCreation.

contract TokenCreationInterface {
uint public closingTime;
uint public minTokensToCreate;
bool public isFueled;
address public privateCreation;
ManagedAccount extraBalance;
mapping (address => uint256) weiGiven;
function TokenCreation(uint _minTokensToCreate, uint _closingTime);
function createTokenProxy(address _tokenHolder) returns (bool success);
function refund();
function divisor() returns (uint divisor);
event FuelingToDate(uint value);
event CreatedToken(address indexed to, uint amount);
event Refund(address indexed to, uint value);
}

Above is the interface of the TokenCreation contract (A.2).

The integer closingTime is the (unix) time at which the Creation Phase ends.

The integer minTokensToCreate is the number of weiequivalent tokens which are needed to be created by the DAO in order to be considered fueled.

The boolean isFueled is true if DAO has reached its minimum fueling goal, false otherwise.

The address privateCreation is used for DAO splits - if it is set to 0, then it is a public Creation, otherwise, only the address stored in privateCreation is allowed to
create tokens.

The managed account (A.5) extraBalance is used to hold the excess ether which is received after the Creation rate is decreased during the Creation Phase.
Anything that has been paid above the initial price goes to this account.

The map weiGiven stores the amount of wei given by each contributor during the Creation Phase and is only used to refund the contributors if the Creation Phase does not reach its fueling goal.

The constructor TokenCreation initiates the Creation Phase with the arguments minTokensToCreate, closingtime and privateCreation, which will be set in the constructor of the DAO contract (A.3) which is only executed once, when the DAO is deployed.
In order to interact with the contract the following functions can be used:

createTokenProxy.
This function creates one unit of the DAO tokens minimum denomination for every wei sent.
The price is calculated as
Ξc · 20/divisor
Here Ξc is the amount of wei given in order to create tokens, and divisor is calculated depending on the time: 20/P(t) , as described in section 5.
The parameter tokenHolder defines the receiver of the newly minted tokens.

refund.
This function can be called by any contributor to receive their wei back if the Creation Phase failed to meet its fueling goal.

divisor.
This function is used to calculate the price of the token during the Creation Phase in the function createTokenProxy.

The events FuelingToDate, CreatedToken and Refund are used to inform lightweight clients of the status of the Creation Phase.

6.3. DAO.

contract DAOInterface {
Proposal[] public proposals;
uint minQuorumDivisor;
uint lastTimeMinQuorumMet;
address public curator;
address[] public allowedRecipients;
mapping (address => uint) public rewardToken;
uint public totalRewardToken;
ManagedAccount public rewardAccount;
ManagedAccount public DAOrewardAccount;
mapping (address => uint) public paidOut;
mapping (address => uint) public DAOpaidOut;
mapping (address => uint) public blocked;
uint public proposalDeposit;
uint sumOfProposalDeposits;
DAO_Creator public daoCreator;

struct Proposal {
address recipient;
uint amount;
string description;
uint votingDeadline;
bool open;
bool proposalPassed;
bytes32 proposalHash;
uint proposalDeposit;
bool newCurator;
SplitData[] splitData;
uint yea;
uint nay;
mapping (address => bool) votedYes;
mapping (address => bool) votedNo;
address creator;
}

struct SplitData {
uint splitBalance;
uint totalSupply;
uint rewardToken;
DAO newDAO;
}

modifier onlyTokenholders {}

function DAO(
address _curator,
DAO_Creator _daoCreator,
uint _proposalDeposit,
uint _minTokensToCreate,
uint _closingTime,
address _privateCreation
)
function () returns (bool success);
function receiveEther() returns(bool);
function newProposal(
address _recipient,
uint _amount,
string _description,
bytes _transactionData,
uint _debatingPeriod,
bool __newCurator
) onlyTokenholders returns (uint _proposalID);
function checkProposalCode(
uint _proposalID,
address _recipient,
uint _amount,
bytes _transactionData
) constant returns (bool _codeChecksOut);
function vote(
uint _proposalID,
bool _supportsProposal
) onlyTokenholders returns (uint _voteID);
function executeProposal(
uint _proposalID,
bytes _transactionData
) returns (bool _success);
function splitDAO(
uint _proposalID,
address _newCurator
) returns (bool _success);
function newContract(address _newContract);
function changeAllowedRecipients(address _recipient, bool _allowed) external returns (bool _success);
function changeProposalDeposit(uint _proposalDeposit) external;
function retrieveDAOReward(bool _toMembers) external returns (bool _success);
function getMyReward() returns(bool _success);
function withdrawRewardFor(address _account) returns(bool _success);
function transferWithoutReward(address _to, uint256 _amount) returns (bool success);
function transferFromWithoutReward(
address _from,
address _to,
uint256 _amount
) returns (bool success);
function halveMinQuorum() returns (bool _success);
function numberOfProposals() constant returns (uint _numberOfProposals);
function getNewDAOAdress(uint _proposalID) constant returns (address _newDAO);
function isBlocked(address _account) internal returns (bool);
function unblockMe() returns (bool);
event ProposalAdded(
uint indexed proposalID,
address recipient,
uint amount,
bool newCurator,
string description
);

event Voted(uint indexed proposalID, bool position, address indexed voter);
event ProposalTallied(uint indexed proposalID, bool result, uint quorum);
event NewCurator(address indexed _newCurator);
event AllowedRecipientAdded(address indexed _recipient);
}

The original contract used as a starting point for the DAO was: http://chriseth.github.io/browser-solidity/?gist=192371538cf5e43e6dab as described in https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/12/04.
The main feature added is the splitting mechanism and all that comes with it.
This section will define the member variables and functions from the above smart contract one at a time.

The array proposals holds all the proposals ever made.

The integer minQuorumDivisor is used to calculate the quorum needed for a proposal to pass.
It is set to 5, but will double in the case a quorum has not been reached for over a year.

The integer lastTimeMinQuorumMet keeps track of the last time the quorum was reached.

The address curator is set at the creation of the DAO and defines the Curator.

The list allowedRecipients is commonly referred to as the whitelist.
The DAO can only send transactions to itself, the curator, extraBalance and addresses in the whitelist.
Only the curator can add/remove addresses to/from the whitelist.

The map rewardToken tracks the addresses that are owed rewards generated by the products of the DAO.
Those addresses can only be DAOs.

The integer totalRewardToken tracks the amount of reward tokens in existence.

The variable rewardAccount is of the type ManagedAccount , which will be discussed in A.5.
It is used to manage the rewards which are to be distributed to the DAO Token Holders.

Similar, DAOrewardAccount is also of the type ManagedAccount.
This account is used to receive all rewards from projects funded by the DAO.
It will then redistribute them amongst all splitted DAOs as well as itself using the function retrieveDAOReward.

The map paidOut is used to keep track how much wei a single token holder has already retrieved from rewardAccount.

Similar, the map DAOpaidOut is used to keep track how much a single DAO has already received from DAOrewardAccount.

The map blocked stores the addresses of the DAO Tokens that have voted and therefore are not allowed to be transferred until the vote has concluded.
The address points to the proposal ID.

The integer proposalDeposit specifies the minimum deposit to be paid in wei for any proposal that does not include a change of the Curator.

The integer sumOfProposalDeposits is the sum of all proposal deposits of open proposals.

The contract daoCreator is used to create a new DAO with the same code as this DAO, used in the case of a split.

A single proposal has the parameters:

recipient: The address where the amount of wei will go to if the proposal is accepted.

amount: The amount of wei to transfer to recipient if the proposal is accepted.

description: A plain text description of the proposal.

votingDeadline: A unix timestamp, denoting the end of the voting period.

open: A boolean which is false if the votes have already been counted, true otherwise.

proposalPassed: A boolean which is true if a quorum has been achieved with the majority approving the proposal.

proposalHash: A hash to check validity of a proposal.
Equal to sha3(_recipient, _amount, _transactionData).

proposalDeposit: The deposit (in wei) the creator of a proposal has send to submit a proposal.
It is taken from the msg.value of a newProposal call; its purpose is to prevent spam.
Its minimal value is set when the contract is deployed as constructor parameter.
But the creator of the proposal can send any amount above this for the deposit.
The proposals will be sorted by the proposal deposit in the GUI, so in the case that a proposal is considered important, the creator of the proposal can deposit extra ether to advertise their proposal.
The creator of the proposal will be refunded the entire deposit if quorum is reached, if it is not reached the deposit remains with the DAO.

newCurator: A boolean which is true if this proposal assigns a new Curator.

splitData: The data used to split the DAO.
This data is gathered from proposals when they require a new Curator.

yea: Number of tokens in favor of the proposal.

nay: Number of tokens opposed to the proposal.

votedYes: Simple mapping to check if a token holder has voted for it.

votedNo: Simple mapping to check if a token holder has voted against it.

creator: The address of the token holder that created the proposal.

The split data structure is used to split the DAO.
It contains:

splitBalance: The balance of the current DAO minus the proposal deposit at the time of split.

totalSupply: The total amount of DAO tokens in existence at the time of the split.

rewardToken: The amount of reward tokens owned by the original DAO at the time of split.

newDAO: The address of the new DAO contract (0 if not created yet).

Those are all the member variables which are stored in this smart contract on the blockchain.
This information can at any time be read from the blockchain using an Ethereum client.

This section will discuss the functions of the DAO contract in detail.
Many of the member variables that are used in this contract are defined in one of the other three contracts.

There is a special function which is called the constructor.
It has the same name as the contract “DAO.”
This function is only executed once, when the DAO is created.
In the DAO constructor, the following variables are set:
• curator
• daoCreator
• proposalDeposit
• rewardAccount
• DAOrewardAccount
• minTokensToCreate
• closingTime
• privateCreation
• lastTimeMinQuorumMet
• minQuorumDivisor
• allowedRecipients

In order to interact with the smart contract the following functions are used:

fallback function. The fallback function is a function without a specific name.
It is called when the contract receives a transaction without data (a pure value transfer).
There are no direct arguments for this function.
The fallback function will call createTokenProxy passing the address of the sender as an argument during the Creation Phase.
This will trigger the immediate creation of tokens.
In order to protect users, this function will send the ether received after the end of the Creation Phase back to the sender for a time period of 40 days.
After which this function is repurposed to receive ether as simple deposit to the DAO using the function receiveEther.

receiveEther. A simple function used to receive ether.
It does nothing but return true when the DAO receives ether.

newProposal. This function is used to create a new proposal.
The arguments of the function are:
recipient: The address of the recipient of the ether in the proposal (has to be the DAO address itself, the current Curator or an address on the whitelist allowedRecipients).
amount: The amount of wei to be sent in the proposed transaction.
description: A string describing the proposal.
transactionData: The data of the proposed transaction.
debatingPeriod: The amount of time to debate the proposal, at least 2 weeks for a normal proposal
and at least 1 week for a new Curator proposal.
newCurator: A boolean defining whether this proposal is for a new Curator or not.
After checking the sanity of the proposal (see code), this function creates a proposal which is open for voting for a certain amount of time.
The function will return a proposal ID which is used to vote.

checkProposalCode. This function is used to check that a certain proposal ID matches a certain transaction.
The arguments of the function are:
proposalID: The proposal ID.
recipient: The address of the recipient of the proposed transaction.
amount: The amount of wei to be sent with the proposed transaction.
transactionData: The data of the proposed transaction.
If the recipient, the amount and the transactionData match the proposal ID, the function will return true, otherwise it will return false.
This will be used to verify that the proposal ID matches what the DAO token holder thinks they are voting on.

vote. This function is used to vote on a proposal.
The arguments of the function are:
proposalID: The proposal ID.
supportsProposal: A boolean Yes/No does the DAO token holder support the proposal
The function simply checks whether the sender has yet to vote and whether the proposal is still open for voting.
If both requirements are met, it records the vote in the storage of the contract.
The tokens used to vote will be blocked, meaning they can not be transferred until the proposal is closed.
This is to avoid voting several times with different sender addresses.

executeProposal. This function can be called by anyone.
It counts the votes, in order to check whether the quorum is met, and executes the proposal if it passed, unless it is a proposal for a new Curator, than it does nothing.
The arguments of the function are:
proposalID: The proposal ID.
transactionData: The data of the proposed transaction
The function checks whether the voting deadline has passed and that the transactionData matches the proposal ID.
Then it checks whether the quorum has been met (see Eq. 1) and if the proposal had a majority of support.
If this is the case, it executes the proposal and refunds the proposal deposit.
If the quorum has been achieved, but the proposal was declined by the majority of the voters, the proposal deposit is refunded and the proposal closes.

splitDAO. After a new Curator has been proposed, and the debating period in which the token holders could vote for or against the proposal has passed, this function is called by each of the DAO token holders that want to leave the current DAO and move to a new DAO with the proposed new Curator.
This function creates a new DAO and moves a portion of the ether, as well as a portion of the reward tokens to the new DAO.
The arguments are:
proposalID: The proposal ID.
newCurator: The address of the new Curator of the new DAO.
After a sanity check (see code), this function will create the new DAO if it hasnt already been created using the contract daoCreator, updates the split data stored in the proposal and stores the address of the new DAO in the split data.
This function moves the portion of ether that belongs to the caller of this function in the original DAO to the new DAO.
This ether amount is denoted by Ξsender, stated in wei and is calculated as follows:

(eqn.4)

Here Tsender is the amount of tokens of the caller of the function and ΞDAO is the balance of the DAO at the time of the split.
This will be used to effectively create tokens in the newly created DAO and fuel the new DAO just as the original DAO was fueled.
In addition to the ether which is moved to the new DAO, the reward tokens Rsender are also transferred.
They are calculated as follows:

(eqn.5)

Where RDAO is the amount of reward tokens owned by the original DAO at the time of the split.
These tokens allow the new DAO to retrieve their portion of the reward using the retrieveDAOReward function of the original DAO.
At the end of this process all original DAO tokens of the sender account are destroyed.
It is important to notice that in all integer division descirbed above, there may be remainders which stay with the DAO.

newContract. This function can only be called by the DAO itself (through a proposal and a vote) and is used to move all remaining ether, as well as all rewardTokens to a new address.
This is used to update the contract.
The new address needs to be approved by the Curator.

transfer and transferFrom. These functions overload the functions defined in the Token contract.
They do call transfer / transferFrom function in the Token contract, but they additionally transfer information about the already paid out rewards attached to the tokens being transferred using the transferPaidOut function.

transferPaidOut. This function is called when making any transfer of DAO tokens using transfer or transferFrom and it updates the array paidOut to track the amount of rewards which has been paid out already, P, and is calculated as follows:

(eqn.6)

Here Pfrom is the total amount of ether which has been paid out to the from address (the sender), Tamount is the amount of tokens to be transferred and Tfrom is the amount of tokens owned by the from address.

transferWithoutReward and transferFromWithoutReward.
The same as transfer and transferFrom, but it calls getMyReward prior to that.

getMyReward. Calls withdrawRewardFor with the sender as the parameter.
This is used to withdraw the portion of the rewards which belong to the sender from the rewardAccount.

withdrawRewardFor. This function is used to retrieve the portion of the rewards in the rewardAccount which belong to the address given as a parameter.
The amount of ether Ξreward which is then sent to the DAO token holder that
calls this function is:

(eqn.7)

Here ΞrewardAccount is the total rewards ever received by the rewardAccount and ΞpaidOut[sender] is the total amount of wei which has already been paid out to the DAO token holder address, which is given as a parameter.
The reward tokens are further elaborated in section 8.

retrieveDAOReward. This function, when called by a DAO, sends the rewards which belong to this DAO from DAOrewardAccount to either the DAO itself, or to the rewardAccount of the respective DAO in order to be distributed among its token holders, depending on the parameter _toMembers.

changeAllowedRecipients. This function can add/remove an address to/from the whitelist, allowedRecipients.
It can only be executed by the Curator.

halveMinQuorum. When called, halves the minimum quorum in the case it has not been met for over 52 weeks, by doubling minQuorumDivisor.
Also the curator can call this function without the 52 weeks limit, but not more than once every other week.

numberOfProposals. Returns the total number of proposals ever created.

getNewDAOAdress. This is just a helper function to read the address of a newly created ‘split DAO‘.
It gets the proposal ID which was used for the split as input parameter and returns the address of the new DAO.

isBlocked. This function returns true when the address given as parameter is currently blocked to transfer tokens due to an ongoing vote it has participated in, otherwise it returns false.
It also unblocks the tokens in the case the voting deadline of the proposal is over.

unblockMe. Calling isBlocked with the address of the sender.

changeProposalDeposit. This function changes the parameter proposalDeposit. It can only be called by the DAO through a transaction which was proposed and voted for by a majority of the token holders.

6.4. Managed Account

contract ManagedAccountInterface {
address public owner;
bool public payOwnerOnly;
uint public accumulatedInput;
function payOut(address _recipient, uint _amount) returns (bool);
event PayOut(address _recipient, uint _amount);
}

This contract is used to manage the rewards and the extraBalance (as explained in section 5).
It has two member variables:

The address owner, is the only address with permission to withdraw from that account (in our case the DAO) and send ether to another address using the payOut function.

The bool payOwnerOnly specifies whether the owner is the only address which can receive ether from this account.

The integer, accumulatedInput, represents the total sum of ether (in wei) which has been sent to this contract so far.

The fallback function is called when the contract receives a transaction without data (a pure value transfer).
There are no direct arguments for this function.
When it is called it counts the amount of ether it receives and stores it in accumulatedInput.

The function payOut can only be executed by the owner (in our case the DAO).
It has two arguments: recipient and amount.
It is used to send amount wei to a recipient and is called by getMyReward in the DAO contract.

7. Reward Tokens

This section gives a description of how reward tokens are implemented in this contract.
Much of the information has already been explained, but it is restated here for clarity.

Reward tokens are used to divide the ether sent to DAOrewardAccount amongst the various DAOs that own reward tokens.
Reward tokens are only transferred in the event of a DAO split or an update of the contract, they can never be owned by anything other than the original DAO or a fork of the original DAO that generated the reward tokens.

Reward tokens are generated when the DAO makes any transaction spending ether.
When the DAOs products send ether back to the DAO, the ether is held within DAOrewardAccount.
The DAO can use these rewards to fund new proposals or to fairly distribute the rewards to the reward token holders (using a proposal which gets voted on by the DAO token holders).

Then the token holders of the DAOs will be able to claim the ether they have earned for their contribution to the original DAO that issued the reward token.
To do this the DAO retrieve its rewards by callling the retrieveDAOReward function, with the paramter _toMembers set to true, which send the rewards to the rewardAccount (a ManagedAccount contract) and keeps track of the payouts in DAOpaidOut.
Then and only then will the token holders of the DAOs be able to call the getMyReward function and receive their ether.

These payouts are tracked by the map paidOut which keeps track of which token holders have claimed their fair portion of the rewards.
This process guarantees that any DAO token holder whose ether was spent building a product will receive the rewards promised to them from that product even if they decide to split from the DAO.

8. Split

This section formally describes a few important parameters and their behavior during a split.

The total amount of DAO tokens totalSupply is defined as follows:

(eqn.8)

Where Ti is the amount of DAO tokens owned by an address i (balances[i]).
Note that 2^256 is the total number of possible addresses in Ethereum.
Similarly, the amount of reward tokens Rtotal is defined as follows:

(eqn.9)

For every passed proposal that sends ether out of the DAO, an amount of reward tokens equal to the amount being spent (in wei) is created.

Lets assume that during the split, a fraction of DAO tokens, X, changes the Curator and leaves the DAO.
The new DAO created receives X · ΞDAO pre, a portion of the remaining ether from the original DAO.

(eqn.10)

Here ΞDAO pre is the ether balance of the original DAO before the split and ΞDAO post is the ether balance of the original DAO after the split.

A portion of the reward tokens is transferred to the new DAO in a very similar manner:

(eqn.11)

Here RDAO is the amount of reward tokens owned by the DAO (prior to the first split 100% of all rewards tokens ever created are owned by the DAO).

(eqn.12)

The number of reward tokens owned by the new DAO are denoted by RnewDAO.
The total amount of reward tokens Rtotal stays constant during the split, no reward tokens are ever destroyed.

The original DAO tokens of the accounts that confirmed the new Curator are destroyed. Hence:

(eqn.13)

This process allows DAO token holders to retrieve their ether from the DAO at any time without losing out on any of the future rewards.
They are entitled to receive even if they choose to leave the DAO.

9. Updates

Although the code of the contract specified at a certain address in the Ethereum blockchain can not be changed, there might still be a need for a single member or the DAO as a whole to change the contracts.
Every single member can always split the DAO as described above and move their funds to a new DAO.
From there they can move their funds to another new DAO with a new smart contract.
But in order to use a new code for the complete DAO one can simply create a new DAO contract with all the needed features and deploy it on the blockchain, and make a proposal to call the newContract function with the address of the new contract as parameter.
If accepted, the complete DAO moves to the new contract, meaning, all ether and reward tokens are transferred to the new contract.
In order to use the same underlying DAO tokens there, one can use the approve function and give the new DAO the right to move the tokens.
In the new contract this right should only be usable in restricted functions which are only callable by the owner of the tokens.
Another option is to create new tokens in the new contract based on the token distribution in the old contract.
This can also be achieved by a proof that the old tokens are destroyed (sending to the 0 address).
This process allows for the DAO to maintain static immutable code on the Ethereum blockchain, while still being able to be updated if the need arises.

10. Acknowledgements

I want to thank Stephan Tual and Simon Jentzsch for fruitful discussions and corrections, as well as Gavin Wood and Christian Reitwiessner for a review of the contracts and the development of Solidity, the programing language used to write the contracts.

Special thanks goes to Yoichi Hirai and Lefteris Karapetsas for reviewing the smart contracts and making significant improvements.

I also want to thank Griff Green for reviewing and editing the paper.

Last but not least I want to thank our community which has given feedback, corrections and encouragement.

References

John Biggs. When Crowdfunding Fails The Backers Are Left With No Way Out. 2015. URL http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/19/when-crowdfunding-fails-the-backers-are-left-with-no-way-out/.

Vitalik Buterin. Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform. 2013. URL https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper.

Vitalik Buterin. The Subjectivity / Exploitability Tradeoff. 2015. URL https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/02/14/subjectivity-exploitability-tradeoff/.

Griff Green. private discussion. 2016.

Kate Knibbs. The 9 Most Disgraceful Crowdfunding Failures of 2015. 2015. URL http://gizmodo.com/the-9-most-disgraceful-crowdfunding-failures-of-2015-1747957776.

Massolution. 2015CF - Crowdfunding Industry Report. 2015. URL http://reports.crowdsourcing.org/index.php?route=product/product&path=0_20&product_id=54.

Mark Miller. The Future of Law. In paper delivered at the Extro 3 Conference (August 9), 1997.

Christian Reitwiessner and Gavin Wood. Solidity. 2015. URL http://solidity.readthedocs.org/.

Nick Szabo. Formalizing and securing relationships on public networks. First Monday, 2(9), 1997.

Gavin Wood. Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger. 2014. URL http://gavwood.com/paper.pdf.

Appendix A. Contracts

A.1. Token

https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/Token.sol

A.2. TokenCreation

https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/TokenCreation.sol

A.3. DAO

https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/DAO.sol

A.4. Sample Offer

https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/Offer.sol

A.5. Managed Account

DOING of DoEth

creating of DoEth

description::
A DAO is activated by deployment on the Ethereum blockchain.
[https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf]
===
DAOs are formed by groups of like-minded individuals with specific projects and goals in mind.
[https://blog.slock.it/a-primer-to-the-decentralized-autonomous-organization-dao-69fb125bd3cd#.9wdemu25y]

managing of DoEth

voting of DoEth

main-function of DoEth

SPECIFIC

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth.specific,

specific::
* The-DAO,
* Aragon,
* MakerDAO,
* dxDAO,

Deth-DeOzn.CHARITY

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth.charity,

addressWpg::
* https://medium.com/charitydao/charity-dao-e9592dd80ab7#.rr9nxcvce,

Deth-DeOzn.THE-DAO

description::
The DAO was[citation needed] a digital decentralized autonomous organization and a form of investor-directed venture capital fund.[5]
The DAO had an objective to provide a new decentralized business model for organizing both commercial and non-profit enterprises.[6][7] It was instantiated on the Ethereum blockchain, and had no conventional management structure or board of directors.[6] The code of the DAO is open-source.[8]
The DAO was stateless, and not tied to any particular nation state. As a result, many questions of how government regulators would deal with a stateless fund were yet to be dealt with.[9]
The DAO was crowdfunded via a token sale in May 2016. It set the record for the largest crowdfunding campaign in history.[5]
In June 2016, hackers exploited a vulnerability in the DAO code to enable them to siphon off one third of The DAO's funds to a subsidiary account. On the 20th July 2016, the Ethereum community decided to hard-fork the Ethereum blockchain to restore virtually all funds to the original contract.[10] This was controversial, and led to a fork in Ethereum, where the original unforked blockchain was maintained as Ethereum Classic, thus breaking Ethereum into two separate active cryptocurrencies.[11][12]
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_DAO_(organization)]

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth.The-DAO!⇒The-DAO,
* McsEngl.Ethereum-The-DAO!⇒The-DAO,
* McsEngl.The-DAO,

stakeholder of The-DAO

description::
"It attracted ~18,000 participants,"
[https://blog.gnosis.pm/2019-is-the-year-of-the-dao-5a428f90fb55]

name::
* McsEngl.The-DAO'stakeholder,

asset of The-DAO

description::
"The DAOs’ mandate was to act as a stakeholder-driven crowdfunding platform.
... raised $150 million to fund proposed projects"
[https://blog.gnosis.pm/2019-is-the-year-of-the-dao-5a428f90fb55]

name::
* McsEngl.The-DAO'asset,

info-resource of The-DAO

addressWpg::
* https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf,
* https://forum.daohub.org/,
* https://github.com/slockit/DAO,
===
* {2016-08-24} Christoph-Jentzsch, https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5,
* {2016-08-24} http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/,
* http://vessenes.com/deconstructing-thedao-attack-a-brief-code-tour/,
* {2016-05-29} Kate, What Is The DAO and Why Is It the Biggest Crowdfunding Project in History? https://letstalkpayments.com/ what-is-the-dao-and-why-is-it-the-biggest-crowdfunding-project-in-the-history/,

EVOLUTING of The-DAO

{2016-07-20}:
=== the-hard-fork:
The specs were implemented by the client’s developers (including Geth, Parity, EthereumJ, Đ-Eth, etc) and the choice whether to fork or not was left to the community by using a switch when starting their client. At block 1920000 (on July 20th), the hard fork became active as a majority of miners and nodes moved to the new version of the chain. The hard fork worked smoothly.
Original DAO token holders started to withdraw their ETH, while the signatories of the curator multisig started to work on the edge cases (note: this is still a work in progress)
Surprisingly, the old chain did receive more support than expected. Exchanges listed the token of the old chain (under the name “Ether classic”), and blockchain explorers were created. Users found themselves confronted with the choice of two chains, which challenged the former Robin Hood Group to start the process of also returning the ETC, an ongoing process.
[https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5#.ee5j2jh44]

{2016-06-17}:
=== the-hack:
On the 17th of June, the attacker withdrew around 3.5M ETH (~50M$) from the DAO and into a child DAO. Thus, started the long and difficult fight to recover the funds.
[https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5#.ee5j2jh44]

{2016-04-30-2016-05-28}:
=== The DAO ICO
April 30, 2016 - May 28, 2016
Crowdsale Details
The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization and future client of Slock.it, is holding an ICO. It is not quite a crowdsale: the DAO is selling ownership of itself and raising ETH in the process. The DAO’s first act will be to hire Slock.it to do their work.

How are funds collected?    To obtain DAO tokens, follow the wizard here or send ETH from your Ethereum Wallet (NOT an exchange) to The DAO’s address, given on on the same page.
Coin Distribution    All tokens will be distributed to those who contribute ETH. None are set aside for developers.
Escrow Used    Unknown
Rate    100 DAO Tokens per ETH for the first 14 days (roughly $.08/token). Then a linear increase for the next 10 days. For last 14 days, 100 DAO Tokens per 1.5 ETH (roughly $.12/token)
Project Valuation    Currently unknown, the valuation will be based on the amount of ETH raised.
Currencies used    ETH

How do the coins or tokens work?
How are they used?    The tokens represent ownership over the DAO, which includes being able to nominate and vote on DAO activities, nominate and vote on DAO curators. At any point, token holders can burn their tokens and retrieve their unspent ETH. Read more about token holder abilities here.
What is the market for these coins?    Any profits the DAO makes on its investments will be given back to token holders as dividends.
How are they produced?    The only way future DAO tokens are created is through vote of the token holders.
[https://www.smithandcrown.com/event/the-dao-ico/]

Deth-DeOzn.MakerDAO

description::
Maker is a decentralized autonomous organization on the Ethereum blockchain seeking to minimize the price volatility of its own stable token — the Dai — against the IMF’s international currency basket SDR.
[http://makerdao.com/]

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth.MakerDAO!⇒MakerDAO,
* McsEngl.MakerDAO,
* McsEngl.MakerDAO--Deth-DeOzn!⇒MakerDAO,

info-resource of MakerDAO

addressWpg::
* https://makerdao.com/,
===
* {2019-06-13} Julia-Magas, https://cointelegraph.com/news/internal-power-struggle-at-makerdao-when-coding-and-personal-interests-collide,
* {2019-05-02} David-Siegel, https://medium.com/@pullnews/maker-dai-economics-part-i-bb34ba258a6f,
* {2019-04-28} https://cointelegraph.com/news/makerdao-cto-departs-points-to-internal-conflicts,
* https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/04/25/inside-maker-dao-leadership-conflict-over-direction-fuels-multiple-departures-as-it-eyes-launch-of-ats/,

Deth-DeOzn.Colony

description::
"A platform for open organizations."
[https://colony.io/]

name::
* McsEngl.DoEth.Colony,

DeOzn.ARAGON (Ethereum)

description::
· Aragon-DeOzn is a-Deth-DeOzn created using the-Aragon-Dapp,

name::
* McsEngl.Aragon-DeOzn!⇒DoAragon, {2019-05-06},
* McsEngl.Aragon-organization!⇒DoAragon, {2019-06-17},
* McsEngl.DoEth.Aragon!⇒DoAragon,
* McsEngl.DoAragon, {2019-06-16},
* McsEngl.DeOzn.Aragon!⇒DoAragon,

stakeholder of DoAragon

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'stakeholder,

generic-tree::
* stakeholder-of--DeOzn,

entity of DoAragon

description::
"... accounts and contracts (what Aragon refers to as “entities”)"
[https://help.aragon.org/article/6-anatomy-of-an-aragon-organization]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'entity,

human of DoAragon

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'human,

specific::
* https://aragon.one/#team,
* Guende.Luis: project leader. by Luis Cuende, who was featured on the 'Forbes 30 under 30' category in 'Technology'.,

asset of DoAragon

governance of DoAragon

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'governance!⇒Aragon-govc,
* McsEngl.Aragon-govc,

permission of govc

description::
"Aragon organizations control which addresses have access to perform actions on behalf of the organization in a permission registry called the Access Control List."
[https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'ACL!⇒Aragon-permission,
* McsEngl.DoAragon'access-control-list!⇒Aragon-permission,
* McsEngl.DoAragon'permission-architecture!⇒Aragon-permission,
* McsEngl.Aragon-permission,

tool of DoAragon

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'tool,

Aragon-stack of DoAragon

description::
· Aragon-stack can-be-thought-of as an-operating-system for human-organizations which manages the-entities that have access to underlying resources.
[https://hack.aragon.org/docs/stack]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Aragon-stack,

client of DoAragon

description::
"1.1. About Aragon Core
Aragon is a dApp that lets anyone create and manage any kind of organization (companies, open source projects, NGOs, foundations, hedge funds...) on the Ethereum blockchain.
Aragon implements basic features of an organization like a cap table, token transfers, voting, role assignments, fundraising, and accounting.
The behavior of an Aragon organization is easily customized by changing the bylaws.
In addition, Aragon organizations are extensible through third party modules that interact with the organizations' contracts."
[https://github.com/AragonOne/whitepaper/raw/master/Aragon%20Whitepaper.pdf]

name::
* McsEngl.Aragon-client,
* McsEngl.Aragon-Core!⇒Aragon-client,
* McsEngl.Deth-Dapp.Aragon-client!⇒Aragon-client,

generic-tree::
* Ethereum-DAO-dApp,

Aragon-desktop

description::
"Aragon Desktop is an Electron app that runs the Aragon client in a fully decentralized way.
It queries the Ethereum blockchain for the latest version of the app, and then serves it over a local IPFS node."
[https://github.com/aragon/aragon-desktop]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Aragon-Desktop,

Dapp of DoAragon

description::
"Each Aragon organization has apps that can be “installed” on aragonOS. These apps extend the functionality of the organization and give members new ways of interacting with each other and the organization itself. Some examples of applications that can be added to Aragon organizations are the Token Manager, Voting, and Finance apps. Anyone can develop their own app, add it to their own organization, and publish it for others to use as well."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/6-anatomy-of-an-aragon-organization]
==
"Aragon organizations are fully modular.
You can install apps that enhance your organization.
Maybe you want a different voting process, or a different way to manage funds."
[https://aragon.org/discover]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Dapp!⇒DoAragon-Dapp,
* McsEngl.DoAragon-Dapp,

Home-page of DoAragon

description::
"The Home page is a simple landing page that shows you the name of the organization you have loaded, as well as different actions that you can take using the pre-installed apps in your organization. For example, in the organization bella.aragonid.eth we can perform the actions Assign Tokens, Vote, Check Finance, and New Payment."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/17-home]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Home-page,

Token-Manager of DoAragon

description::
"The Token Manager is the app that is used to manage membership and voting power in an organization. To add members to an organization, it’s as easy as minting and assigning a token to them."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/18-token-manager]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Token-Manager,
* McsEngl.DoAragon-Dapp.Token-Manager,

Voting-Dapp of DoAragon

description::
"The Voting app is where you can see all open and past votes. You can also use the Voting app to start a new vote and poll tokenholders in the organization about an issue that is important to you."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/19-voting]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Voting-Dapp,

Finance-Dapp of DoAragon

description::
"The Finance app is used to manage the financial resources of an organization. You can see the balance of each asset the organization owns, a history of past transfers, and also create new transfers from the Finance app."

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Finance-Dapp,

Permissions-page of DoAragon

App-Center-page of DoAragon

Settings-page of DoAragon

aragonOS

description::
"The smart contract system Aragon is built on is called aragonOS. This system ensures that only authorized accounts and contracts (what Aragon refers to as “entities”) have permission to perform specific actions in an organization. The same way that a legal contract defines what rights and obligations a party to the contract has, the aragonOS smart contracts define what rights and obligations entities have in an Aragon organization."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/6-anatomy-of-an-aragon-organization]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'aragonOS,

aragonCLI

description::
"The aragonCLI (Command Line Interface) is used to create and develop Aragon Apps, as well as to interact with DAOs (create, install apps, inspect permissions, etc.)."
[https://github.com/aragon/aragon-cli]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'aragonCLI,

template of DoAragon

description::
"The best way to kickstart an Aragon DAO is by using a Kit, or template. A kit is a set of smart contracts that will create a DAO from scratch and configure it according to some provided parameters.
Because they involve smart contract code, modifying a kit, even though really easy, must be done with extreme care. It is always recommended to do a third party security audit to the kit code if modified."
[https://github.com/aragon/dao-kits]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'DAO-kit!⇒DoAragon-template,
* McsEngl.DoAragon'template!⇒DoAragon-template,
* McsEngl.DoAragon-template,

info-resource of template

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon-template'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://github.com/aragon/dao-kits,
* https://help.aragon.org/article/8-about-templates,

template.DEMOCRACY

description::
"A “Token project with Democracy” is an organization where the vote cast by a tokenholder is weighted proportionally to their ownership stake of tokens minted by the organization. For example, if a tokenholder owns 5% of the tokens minted by the organization then their vote will count as 5% of the total votes on a given proposal."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/9-create-a-new-democracy-organization]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon-template.Democracy,

template.MULTISIG

description::
"A “Token project with Multisig” is an organization where the resources of the organization are controlled by m-of-n members of a multisig contract, where n is 100% of tokenholders and m is the Min. Quorum percentage of tokenholders that must approve a vote for it to pass. For example, in a 2-of-2 multisig organization, two signatures from two different specified accounts are required for a proposal to pass."
[https://help.aragon.org/article/13-create-a-multisig-organization]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon-template.Multisig,

evaluation of DoAragon

organization of DoAragon

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'organization,

Aragon-One

description::
"Aragon One is a Swiss company formed by the founders of the Aragon project, building the tools and community necessary for the project to succeed."
[https://aragon.one/#about]

"Aragon One is a for-profit company that encompasses the foundational team working on the Aragon Project"

name::
* McsEngl.Aragon-One,
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Aragon-One!⇒Aragon-One,

Aragon-Association

description::
"the non-profit steward of the Aragon project."
[https://aragon.one/#about]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Aragon-Association,

info-resource of DoAragon

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://aragon.org/,
* https://aragon.one/,
* https://github.com/aragon,
* https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper,
* https://help.aragon.org/,
* https://hack.aragon.org/docs/tutorial.html,
* dashboard: https://scout.cool/aragon/mainnet,
* https://wiki.aragon.org/,
=== community:
* https://aragon.chat/home,
* https://twitter.com/AragonProject,
* Aragon Mailing List - https://one.us15.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=a590aa3843a54b079d48e6e18&id=e81a44c4bd
* Aragon Forum - https://forum.aragon.org
* Reddit - https://www.reddit.com/r/aragonproject/
* LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/company/aragonproject/
* YouTube - https://www.youtube.com/c/AragonProject
=== news:
* {2019-05-30} Introducing Aragon Fundraising, https://blog.aragon.org/introducing-aragon-fundraising/,
* {2019-05-28} Ross-Campbell, Launching Digital Guilds on OpenLaw & Ethereum, https://medium.com/@rosscampbell9/launching-digital-guilds-on-openlaw-ethereum-5fc8478c655c,
* {2018-10-30} Aragon 0.6 is live on Mainnet, https://blog.aragon.org/aragon-06-is-live-on-mainnet/,
* {2017-04-21} Spain’s Aragon Joins Ethereum Startups Eyeing Token Sale Glory: https://cointelegraph.com/news/spains-aragon-joins-ethereum-startups-eyeing-token-sale-glory,

DoAragon.SPECIFIC

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon.specific,

specific::
* https://app.aragon.org,
* {2019-05-09} Aragon has passed 500 organizations on mainnet [https://twitter.com/AragonProject/status/1126535012520796161],

DoAragon.Aragon-Network

description::
"The Aragon Network is an Aragon organization that provides infrastructure and services to users of the Aragon platform, and is governed by ANT holders. The existing Aragon infrastructure enables users to create and manage organizations. Each Aragon organization exists as a set of smart contracts that define the organization's stakeholders and their associated rights and privileges. However, some rights and privileges require subjective constraints that cannot be encoded in a smart contract directly."
===
"We are committed to transitioning Aragon into a fully decentralized organization. That organization will become the Aragon Network."
[https://aragon.org/project/governance/]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon.Aragon-Network!⇒Aragon-Network,
* McsEngl.Aragon-Network,

Aragon-Court of Aragon-Network

description::
"The Aragon Court is a decentralized oracle protocol developed and maintained by the Aragon Network. The Aragon Court can be used by organizations, including the Aragon Network itself, to resolve subjective disputes with binary outcomes. When combined with the existing Aragon infrastructure, it enables an organization to create Proposal Agreements that define subjective constraints on an organization's operation and can be enforced by minority stakeholders."
[https://github.com/aragon/whitepaper]

name::
* McsEngl.Aragon-Network'Aragon-Court,

DeOzn.DAOstack (Ethereum)

description::
· DAOstack-DeOzn is a-Deth-DeOzn using the-DAOstack-tools.
===
"DAOstack is designed to catalyze the future of collaboration. It's a platform for decentralized governance that enables collectives to self-organize around shared goals or values, easily and efficiently."
[https://medium.com/daostack/about]
===
"DAOstack is building decentralized governance infrastructure"
[https://daostack.io/deck/DAOstack-Deck-en.pdf]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.DAOstack-DeOzn!⇒DAOstack,
* McsEngl.DeOzn.DAOstack!⇒DAOstack,

asset of DAOstack

funds of DAOstack

description::
"The total currently available amount in the DAO is shown on each DAO’s homepage within Alchemy."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'funds,

stakeholder of DAOstack

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'stakeholder,

generic-tree::
* DeOzn-stakeholder,

stakeholder.SPECIFIC

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-stakeholder.specific,

specific::
* governor,
* predictor,

stakeholder.PREDICTOR

description::
· predictors are GEN-holders (members or non-members of a-DAOstack-ogn) who stake GEN on proposals and are-rewarded if the-proposal passes or lose their stake otherwise.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'predictor,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-stakeholder'predictor,

GEN-Prediction (link)

GEN-Predictors-Network

description::
· GPN is the-set of DAOstack-predictors.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'GEN-Predictors-Network,
* McsEngl.DAOstack'GPN,
* McsEngl.GEN-Predictors-Network--of-DAOstack,

stakeholder.GOVERNOR

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-stakeholder.governor!⇒DAOstack-governor,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-governor,

generic-tree::
* DeOzn-governor,

reputation of governor

description::
"In the initial protocol, a user’s Reputation score represents their decision-making power.
Each DAO built on the stack has its own Reputation ledger that records the Reputation scores of users in that DAO.
In any given DAO, the weight of a user’s vote, their “voting power,” is equal to their Reputation score in that DAO.
Since any Ethereum address can be assigned Reputation, other DAOs can also be Reputation-holders, allowing authority to be flexibly distributed across sub-agencies or partner organizations."
[https://medium.com/daostack/a-guide-to-daostacks-initial-reputation-protocol-f8365f157f7a]
===
"In DAOstack, Reputation has the following properties:
Burnable: namely, it is not really “yours.” It is yours as long as the owner of the Reputation system does not choose to take it away. With DAOstack, there is a hidden assumption that the Reputation system owner is not a single person, but rather a DAO, whose actions are controlled by the DAO’s Reputation holders.
Non-transferable: namely, an account to which some Reputation was allocated can neither transfer nor burn it."
[https://medium.com/daostack/reputation-vs-tokens-6d7642c7a538]
===
"Reputation is quantifiable (for example, I have over 150 reputation), but it has no monetary value. However, it does represent how much influence a user has on the system, and that’s why it is integral to the system. By increasing the amount of reputation that you have, you have a greater ability to determine the outcome of proposals."
[https://medium.com/ethex-market/how-to-use-the-alchemy-dapp-and-the-genesis-dao-6bfd91a357dc]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'reputation!⇒DAOstack-reputation,
* McsEngl.DAOstack'reputation-points!⇒DAOstack-reputation,
* McsEngl.DAOstack'voting-power!⇒DAOstack-reputation,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-governor'reputation!⇒DAOstack-reputation,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-reputation,

proposal's-reputation (link)
change of reputation

description::
· the exact consequences of actions that change the-reputation depend on the-configuration of Alchemy that a-DAO is-using.
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-reputation'change,

increase of reputation

description::
"Contributors can increase their reputation by:
* Creating proposals that get accepted by the DAO
* Voting in favor of proposals that get accepted by the DAO
* Voting against proposals that get rejected by the DAO
* Staking in favor of proposals that get accepted by the DAO
* Staking against proposals that get rejected by the DAO"
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]
===
"You can request to receive some reputation in a proposal, however, it’s not directly transferable between users.
It can also be acquired through participating in the DAO in other ways. For example, by submitting and passing a proposal, you can receive more reputation. If you vote correctly on the outcome of a non-boosted proposal, you can receive more reputation, and if you vote incorrectly you lose reputation."
[https://medium.com/ethex-market/how-to-use-the-alchemy-dapp-and-the-genesis-dao-6bfd91a357dc]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-reputation'increase,

decrease of reputation

description::
"Contributors’ reputation might decrease by:
* Failing to follow through on a proposal that they created and has been accepted by the DAO
* Voting in favor of proposals that get rejected by the DAO
* Voting against proposals that get accepted by the DAO
* Staking in favor of proposals that get rejected by the DAO
* Staking against proposals that get accepted by the DAO"
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-reputation'decrease,

info-resource of reputation

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-reputation'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_niOtwmcRBGsGVNQvahB-ANgOlqrH_ZHV4A_PvHu8Yw/edit,
* {2019-02-12} https://medium.com/daostack/a-guide-to-daostacks-initial-reputation-protocol-f8365f157f7a,

voting of governor (link)

stakeholder.POLLINATOR

description::
"What is a ‘Pollinator’?
Pollinators are the community of early adopters using Alchemy as part of the Genesis Alpha DAO.
If you would like to become a Pollinator, send a request with information about yourself and why you would like to join to Erik Rodrigues (telegram: @eriktrodrigues, email: erik@daostack.io)."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'pollinator,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-stakeholder.pollinator,

addressWpg::
* {2018-11-13} Want some REP? - Genesis Alpha Pollinator Onboarding Tutorial (DAOstack), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BucC_e7T2oo,

stakeholder.HUMAN

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'human,

specific::
* Field.Matan (founder),
* Köppelmann.Martin (advisor),

governance of DAOstack

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'governance!⇒DAOstack-govc,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc,

generic-tree::
* DeOzn-govc,

holographic-consensous of DAOstack

description::
"Holographic Consensus
This protocol helps DAOs prioritize their most value-aligned proposals, even with millions of members.
People stake GEN on which proposals the DAO will pass. (GEN is a cryptocurrency for collective attention in DAOs)
After a few stakes, a proposal highly predicted to pass will move to the top of the list, where voters will vote on whether to pass it.
When a vote finishes, people who predicted correctly make a profit on their stake.
This incentivizes people to correctly predict what DAOs care about, and lets DAOs make good decisions without requiring everyone to vote on everything."
[https://daostack.io/deck/DAOstack-Deck-en.pdf]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'holographic-consensus,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'holographic-consensus,

GEN-prediction of DAOstack

description::
"GEN Prediction is a prediction system embedded in DAOstack’s unique DAO governance protocol, which can be accessed through the Alchemy interface. It plays a vital role in solving a basic problem of governance: how to efficiently make decisions that accurately represent the views of large groups of people."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]
===
"In such a DAO, both members and non-members can stake GEN on a proposal, betting that the DAO will either pass or fail it. They have strong motive to do this since correct predictions will earn them a reward. Essentially, both DAO members and outsiders have the opportunity to offer a DAO their expert attention in exchange for a GEN reward, helping the DAO focus on the highest-leverage proposals and make smarter collective decisions. Put another way, any individual who confidently believes a particular proposal will pass can boost it by purchasing a large prediction stake, directly influencing the DAO’s collective attention. This set of incentives is a core part of what we call the “holographic consensus” approach.
... All organizations built on DAOstack are free to install the GEN prediction system in their own governance schemes, and there are some good reasons to include it: 1) GEN prediction puts an existing network of knowledgeable, active predictors to work for you, 2) the module to activate it is pre-built, and 3) it gives the entire GEN ecosystem skin in the game of your DAO’s success."
[https://medium.com/daostack/on-the-utility-of-the-gen-token-eb4f341d770e]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'GEN-prediction,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'GEN-prediction,

reputation-system of DAOstack

description::
"The Reputation system aims to help DAOs maintain and work towards a set of collective preferences or goals."
[https://medium.com/daostack/a-guide-to-daostacks-initial-reputation-protocol-f8365f157f7a]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'reputation-system,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'reputation-system,

GEN-token of DAOstack

description::
· GEN is the-governance-token of DAOstack.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'GEN-token!⇒DvGEN,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'GEN-token!⇒DvGEN,
* McsEngl.DvGEN, {2019-06-03},

GPN of GEN-token (link)

exchange-ogn of GEN-token

description::
"GEN is available on various exchanges and swap services, such as EthFinex, Liquid, IDEX, Slow.trade, and Coinswitch."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DvGEN'exchange-ogn,

generic-tree::
* Dchain-exchange-ogn,

specific::
* Coinswitch,
* EthFinex,
* IDEX,
* Liquid,
* Slow.trade,
* Uniswap (https://uniswap.exchange/swap)

info-resource of GEN-token

name::
* McsEngl.DvGEN'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* {2018-10-07} Ezra-Weller, On the Utility of the GEN Token, DAOstack’s Collective Attention Protocol, https://medium.com/daostack/on-the-utility-of-the-gen-token-eb4f341d770e,

proposal of DAOstack

description::
"A proposal is equivalent to a project pitch that contains an explanation of objectives, methods, costs and milestones of the proposed project."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]
===
"Proposals are DAOs’ basic method of making decisions, and thus funding work and taking collective action."
[https://medium.com/daostack/how-to-use-alchemy-earth-d6df01acb0fc]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'proposal!⇒DAOstack-proposal,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'proposal!⇒DAOstack-proposal,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal,

title of proposal

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'title,

description of proposal

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'description,

document of proposal

description::
· an online document describing in details the-proposal.
· the-Url of this document is-recorded on Alchemy.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'document,

Url of proposal

description::
· the-Url of the-document describing the-proposal.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'Url,

reputation of proposal

description::
"Why should I ask for reputation when submitting a proposal?
You are not required to ask for reputation when submitting a proposal. However, if you would like to be a decision-maker within the DAO, you should request some. Proposals are ultimately passed or failed based off of the voting of reputation holders; without it, you have no ability to help steer the DAO. Generally, having those who submit and execute proposals be the DAO’s decision-makers helps promote a meritocratic governance system."
"How much reputation should I ask for when submitting a proposal?
It’s ultimately up to you, but the norm within the Genesis DAO thus far is a range from 0 to 200 reputation points, varying based on the scope of the project. If you have a good rationale why you should be rewarded more, you are welcome to articulate that in your proposal."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'reputation,

funding of proposal

description::
"How much funding for my proposal can I ask for?
Any amount, since the DAO can go into debt, so users need to take this into consideration when both making proposals and voting. We advise to check the total amount of funds in the DAO and consider breaking proposals in pieces not to sacrifice much of it’s funds at once."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'funding,

proposer of proposal

description::
· proposer is a-stakeholder who creates a-proposal.
===
"Proposers receive an automatic Reputation reward if their proposal passes, because passing a proposal is assumed to contribute to the DAO’s collective goals in some way. Setting this reward to be larger relative to a DAO’s total Reputation will cause the DAO’s Reputation distribution to shift more quickly over time, while setting it to be smaller leads to slower change. As with all of these parameters, each DAO will decide for itself what’s appropriate (possibly even setting the parameter to 0)."
[https://medium.com/daostack/a-guide-to-daostacks-initial-reputation-protocol-f8365f157f7a]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'proposer,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'proposer,

proposing of proposal (link)

stake of proposal

description::
"stakes can be of any size, and they can be either upstakes or downstakes."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'stake,

predictor of proposal (link)
predicting of proposal (link)
staking-reward of proposal

description::
"The most important part of this mechanism for prospective predictors to understand is the staking reward: successful stakers divide the unsuccessful stakers’ loss pro rata to their stakes (minus the portion given to the booster and the executor)."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'predicting-reward,
* McsEngl.DAOstack'staking-reward,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'staking-reward,

DAOstake of proposal

description::
"When submitted, every proposal is automatically downstaked by the DAO — we call this the “DAOstake,” and it acts as a subsidy provided by the DAO to the predictors. The DAOstake ensures there is always an incentive for predictors to upstake promising new proposals, since even if no one else downstakes a proposal, the DAOstake can still be claimed."

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'DAOstack,

confidence-score of proposal

description::
· the-ratio of upstake to downstake.
===
"If a proposal has a confidence score of 3.0 (there is three times as much upstake on it as downstake), that means the DAO “believes” the proposal’s chance of passing is 3 to 1."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'confidence-score,

proposal.SCHEME

description::
· schemes are-called generic proposals (types of proposals).
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.scheme,

specific::
* Contribution-Reward, distributes funds/reputation,
* Scheme-Registrar, changes the-schemes of a-DAO,
*

proposal.REGULAR

description::
"All proposals start life in the regular queue, and they are immediately open for predicting — i.e. they may have GEN stakes placed on them by predictors."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.regular,

proposal.PENDING

description::
"When a proposal’s ratio of upstake to downstake (its confidence score) is above the boosting threshold¹, it is moved into the pending queue. A pending proposal is still open for predicting, and if its confidence score remains above the boosting threshold for longer than the pending period, anyone can boost the proposal."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.pending,

boosting-threshold of proposal

description::
"The boosting threshold is dynamic and grows as the number of boosted proposals grow: C > α^N_B, α > 1, where C is the proposal’s confidence score, a is a constant greater than 1, and N_B is the number of currently boosted proposals."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'boosting-threshold,

pending-period of proposal

description::
· pending-period is TIME defined by a-DAOstack-DeOzn a-pending-proposal must-stay in the-pending-queue.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'pending-period,

proposal.BOOSTED

description::
"A pending proposal is still open for predicting, and if its confidence score remains above the boosting threshold for longer than the pending period, anyone can boost the proposal.
To incentivize people to take this boosting action, whoever boosts a qualified proposal receives a modest GEN reward.²
Once admitted to the boosted queue, proposals are closed to predictions and will be passed or failed at the close of the boosted period. Once a proposal is passed, anyone can take the execute action on it to trigger whatever actions the proposal specifies (distributing funds, deploying contracts, etc.). The executor of the proposal is rewarded in GEN similarly to the booster."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.boosted,

boosting-period of proposal

description::
· boosting-period is the-time a-DAOstack-DeOzn defines a-boosting-proposal must-stay in the-boosting-queue and then to be-executed.

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'boosting-period,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'boosting-period,

proposal.PASSED

description::
· a-passed-proposal is a-boosted-proposal that at the-end of the-boosted-period has positive confidence-score.
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]
===
"How do I get more visibility for my proposal?
Boosted proposals get the most visibility on a DAO’s landing page. The best strategy to get a proposal boosted is to write a compelling proposal that is aligned with the DAO’s purpose. Asking for feedback in a forum with members of the DAO, reaching out to people individually and publishing your proposal in a community channel can also help to convince people to predict your proposal will pass."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.passed,

proposal.FAILED

description::
· a-failed-proposal is a-boosted-proposal that at the-end of the-boosted-period has negative confidence-score.
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.failed,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.rejected,

proposal.EXECUTED

description::
"Once admitted to the boosted queue, proposals are closed to predictions and will be passed or failed at the close of the boosted period. Once a proposal is passed, anyone can take the execute action on it to trigger whatever actions the proposal specifies (distributing funds, deploying contracts, etc.). The executor of the proposal is rewarded in GEN similarly to the booster."
[https://medium.com/daostack/joining-the-gen-predictors-network-f7be2d93754d]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.executed,

proposal.EXAMPLE

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal.example,

addressWpg::
* template: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1nBSIO0tOf1CcfzsyO7dlQd_LiYsV3sKPSQXmCkvibhU/edit,
* tutorial article of Alchemy: https://docs.google.com/document/d/16k4pJ7_iWOnFnCjwyDGZUX492fYtPEeHlxavR_cZw4Y/edit,

parameter of DAOstack

description::
· parameters are attributes a-DAOstack-ogn can-set in its code.
===
"The upcoming Alchemy Earth release will enable DAOs to adjust these parameters through the proposal submission process."
[https://medium.com/daostack/a-guide-to-daostacks-initial-reputation-protocol-f8365f157f7a]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'parameter,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'parameter,

accountability of DAOstack

description::
"How can I be sure that someone whose proposal I voted for will follow through?
Accountability is a developing area within the Genesis Alpha DAO, with more systems and ideas emerging regularly. At the most basic level, social reputation plays a significant role, particularly while the DAO remains very small. At a more procedural level, Genesis Alpha now also has an Accountability Task Force, who is tasked with promoting follow-through and directly penalizing non-delivery, such as by raising proposals to subtract reputation or stop future payments. The DAO is also considering adding escrow functionality that will also help ensure accountability."

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'accountability,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'accountability,

governing of DAOstack

description::
"Alchemy offers a rigorous, on-chain decision-making platform for DAOs, solving their hard governance.
Soft governance, on the other hand, is about the off-chain processes in the DAO; communication, collaboration, deliberation and everything else that eventually lead to the DAO decision-making. If hard governance is the backbone of the DAO, soft governance is its blood and spirit."
[https://medium.com/@matanfield/the-biggest-threat-to-genesis-711c6adbe90]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'governing,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'governing,

specific::
* creating-DeOzn,
* proposing,
* voting,
* staking|predicting,

creating of DAOstack

description::
"Can I create my own DAO using Alchemy?
Not quite yet, but if you are interested in becoming an Alchemy pilot organization, we can potentially assist you in setting up your own DAO. Contact us at alchemy@daostack.io.
In the future you will be able to:
* Create a DAO within Alchemy
* Funnel initial funds to the DAO
* Mint tokens
* Allocate tokens and reputation to your community
* Edit certain governance protocols, for example how much time before a proposal closes, or what majority is needed for a proposal to pass."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'creating,

proposing of DAOstack

description::
"Anyone can propose and predict, however only people who hold reputation (voting power) in that specific DAO can vote."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]
===
"How do I submit a proposal?
While it’s possible to go directly to Alchemy and simply submit a proposal through the proposal form, we recommend the following steps:
1) Draft your proposal with the help of our guidelines using this template
2) Share your draft with others that are part of the DAO you will be submitting to, to get feedback
3) Adapt the proposal based on the feedback you receive
4) Submit your proposal in Alchemy by clicking “create proposal”, adding the ETH amount and reputation you are requesting, shall your proposal pass"
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'proposing,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'proposing,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'proposing,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-proposal'submitting,

predicting of DAOstack

description::
"Predict whether a proposal is going to pass or not in the DAO. This helps guide the collective voting process by sorting and prioritizing the proposals. Predicting is also called staking.
... Anyone can propose and predict, however only people who hold reputation (voting power) in that specific DAO can vote."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'predicting,
* McsEngl.DAOstack'staking,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'predicting,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'staking,

voting of DAOstack

description::
"Anyone can propose and predict, however only people who hold reputation (voting power) in that specific DAO can vote."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'voting,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-govc'voting,

Alchemy of DAOstack

description::
"Alchemy Earth is the latest version of Alchemy, a platform where users can interact directly with DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations) powered by DAOstack, making collaborative decisions about budgeting, policy, and anything else necessary for their organization. There are three basic actions users can take on the platform: proposing, voting, and staking. Together, these actions make up the bulk of a DAO’s decision-making activity."
[https://medium.com/daostack/how-to-use-alchemy-earth-d6df01acb0fc]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'Alchemy,

generic-tree::
* Ethereum-Dapp,

addressWpg::
* https://alchemy.daostack.io/,
* https://github.com/daostack/alchemy,
===
* {2018-10-30} Jordan-Randolph, https://medium.com/ethex-market/how-to-use-the-alchemy-dapp-and-the-genesis-dao-6bfd91a357dc,
* {2018-06-08} Dor-Garbash, https://medium.com/daostack/new-introducing-alchemy-budgeting-for-decentralized-organizations-b81ba8501b23,

info-resource of DAOstack

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://daostack.io/,
* https://github.com/daostack,
* https://daostack.io/wp/DAOstack-White-Paper-en.pdf,
* A Toolkit for Decentralized Governance: https://daostack.io/deck/DAOstack-Deck-en.pdf,
* https://github.com/daostack/DAOstack-Hackers-Kit,
* FAQ: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit,
===
* https://twitter.com/daostack,
* https://medium.com/daostack,
* https://t.me/daodesign,
* https://daotalk.org/,
===
* {2018-08-15} Adam-Levi, The Arc Platform, https://medium.com/daostack/the-arc-platform-2353229a32fc,
* {2018-06-08} Dor-Garbash, Introducing Alchemy — Budgeting for decentralized organizations, https://medium.com/daostack/new-introducing-alchemy-budgeting-for-decentralized-organizations-b81ba8501b23,
* {2018-04-11} Josh-Zemel, An Explanation of DAOstack in Fairly Simple Terms, https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-d0e034739c5a,
* {2018-02-06} Matan-Field, Decentralized Governance Matters, https://medium.com/daostack/decentralized-governance-first-principles-1fc6eaa492ed,

relation-to-Aragon of DAOstack

description::
"What is the difference between Aragon and DAOstack?
DAOstack is a modular governance framework for decentralized organizations at scale, while Aragon is more of a general suite for blockchain-based organizational management.
In terms of token utility, we invite you to read this article to understand the GEN use case and compare it to ANT: https://medium.com/daostack/on-the-utility-of-the-gen-token-eb4f341d770e
We have to admit that Aragon’s applications are looking really nice and we're actually working on a bridge so their application suite can be used by ourselves."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit#heading=h.t3hprwsx8hu0]

name::
* McsEngl.DoAragon'relation-to-DAOstack,
* McsEngl.DAOstack'relation-to-Aragon,

EVOLUTING of DAOstack

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack'evoluting,

{2018spring}::
=== launch:
"The platform, whose alpha launched in spring 2018, includes a modular smart contract framework, a friendly JavaScript developer environment, and an intuitive user interface that allows anyone to create or participate in a decentralized organization without technical knowledge."
[https://medium.com/daostack/an-explanation-of-daostack-in-fairly-simple-terms-d0e034739c5a]

{2017early}::
=== creation:
"At the point when we founded DAOstack at the beginning of 2017, we had two main insights about DAOs. The first was that Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are the most important use case of the blockchain after currency, and the second was that it is impossible to predict what these DAOs will look like, and that there will be a fast evolution of them."
[https://medium.com/daostack/the-arc-platform-2353229a32fc]

DAOstack.Genesis-DAO

description::
"Launched June 2018, the Genesis Alpha was the first DAO powered by DAOstack. Genesis Beta is the second step of a three step plan to eventually transition Genesis to being the “Coordinator DAO” of the DAOstack ecosystem. According to the DAOstack team’s recent statement, Genesis would have additional responsibilities as coordinator, such as management of 40m unminted GEN. In this sense, it could be a decentralized institution that distributes ecosystemic grants loosely analogous to the Ethereum Foundation."
[https://medium.com/daostack/daos-marching-forward-1b8bef05a6d7]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack.Genesis-DAO!⇒Genesis-DAO,
* McsEngl.Genesis-DAO,

info-resource of Genesis-DAO

name::
* McsEngl.Genesis-DAO'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* {2019-02-08} Levi-Adam, A Technical Analysis of the Genesis, https://medium.com/daostack/a-technical-analysis-of-the-genesis-alpha-hack-f8e34433c14b,

functing of Genesis-DAO

description::
* coordinating the-ecosystem,
* will manage a large portion of the funds from DAOstack’s token launch,

name::
* McsEngl.Genesis-DAO'functing,

Genesis-pilot of Genesis-DAO

description::
"Genesis Alpha and the upcoming Genesis Beta together comprise the Genesis pilot."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M1erC1TVPPul3V_RmhKbyuFrpFikyOX0LnDfWOqO20Q/edit]

name::
* McsEngl.Genesis-DAO'Genesis-pilot,

DAOstack.dOrg

description::
"dOrg is a cooperative of freelancers building tools for distributed organizations. We make ecosystem partnerships and execute on work that advances the open-source DAO ecosystem."
[https://dorg.tech/#/about]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack.dOrg!⇒DAOstack-dOrg,
* McsEngl.DAOstack-dOrg,

resouse of DAOstack-dOrg

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack-dOrg'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://dorg.tech/,
* https://github.com/dOrgTech,
===
* {2019-06} https://www.gravelshea.com/2019/06/dorg-launches-first-limited-liability-dao/,

DAOstack.dxDAO

description::
"The dxDAO will be a community-governed DAO with total control over the DutchX trading protocol. Anyone can participate in what will be the first ever fully decentralized trading protocol."
[https://blog.gnosis.pm/introducing-the-dxdao-27ec4301eced]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack.dxDAO!⇒dxDAO,
* McsEngl.dxDAO, {2019-05-30},
* McsEngl.dxDAO--DAOstack-DeOzn!⇒dxDAO,

info-resource of dxDAO

name::
* McsEngl.dxDAO'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://dxdao.daostack.io/,
* https://github.com/gnosis/dx-daostack/blob/master/dxdao-whitepaper-v1.pdf,
===
* {2019-01-10} Martin-Köppelmann, A brief discussion of the protocol governing the dxDAO, https://blog.gnosis.pm/a-brief-discussion-of-the-protocol-governing-the-dxdao-7331407a2555,
* {2018-12-21} Eric-Gorski, Introducing the dxDAO, The dxDAO will launch on May 29, 2019, https://blog.gnosis.pm/introducing-the-dxdao-27ec4301eced,

DAOstack.PolkaDAO

description::
"Web3 Foundation is endowing a community-led DAO with $10,000 in DAI to fund proposals related to Polkadot. The goal of the PolkaDAO is to fund community projects with microgrants that may not have otherwise been funded."
[https://medium.com/daostack/daos-marching-forward-1b8bef05a6d7]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack.PolkaDAO!⇒PolkaDAO,
* McsEngl.PolkaDAO, {2019-06-01},

info-resource of PolkaDAO

name::
* McsEngl.PolkaDAO'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* {2019-05-24} https://medium.com/polkadot-network/polkadao-is-live-e61c39d0b259,

DAOstack.Identity-DAO

description::
"A curated registry of identities on the Ethereum blockchain:
1. Each address is controlled by a single human identity.
2. No two addresses are controlled by the same human identity.
3. All identity metadata attributed to that address (Full name, Twitter handle, etc) corresponds to that human identity."
[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_aS41bvA6D83aTPv6QNehR3PfIRHJKkELnU76Sds5Xk/edit#]

name::
* McsEngl.DAOstack.Identity-DAO,

DeOzn.eosDAC (EOS-net)

description::
· eosDAC[a] is a-DeOzn on Deos-net.
· it[a] is a-block-producer.
===
A Decentralised Autonomous Community (DAC) is governed by it’s constitution, which is encoded in smart contracts on the blockchain. This revolutionary way of bringing a community together as a cooperative is made possible by the EOS software. The DAC is controlled by it’s token holders and the board members they vote to run it’s operations.
eosDAC is being created and launched by BlockMaker Ltd. Once eosDAC is launched BlockMaker Ltd will not have any ownership or control over eosDAC, nor own any eosDAC tokens. BlockMaker Ltd has invested heavily in people, infrastructure and processes, in order to ensure that eosDAC can serve as a main block producer should it receive sufficient votes from EOS token holders.
[http://eosdac.io/]

name::
* McsEngl.Deos-net'BP.eosDAC!⇒eosDAC,
* McsEngl.Deos-net'eosDAC!⇒eosDAC,
* McsEngl.eosDAC, {2019-05-15},
* McsEngl.eosDAC-DeOzn!⇒eosDAC, {2019-05-14},

stakeholder of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'stakeholder,

generic-tree::
* stakeholder-of-DeOzn,

holder of eosDAC

description::
· a-holder is an-EOS-account that holds eosDAC-tokens.
· of course a-human-entity manages this account.
· but a-human-entity can have many accounts.

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'holder,

genesis-member of eosDAC

description::
"1.11 Genesis Member: means BlockMaker Ltd, a company duly incorporated under the Anguilla International Business Companies Act (c. I20)"
[Constitution 1.11]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'BlockMaker-Ltd,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'genesis-member,

member of eosDAC

description::
· member-of-eosDAC is a register holder.
===
"1.13 Member: means a member of the DAC, entitled, qua Member, to all the benefits and subject to all the obligations set out in the Constitution"
[Constitution 1.13]
===
"3.8.3 Upon transfer of any DAC Token, the transferor thereof shall cease to be a Member of the DAC, to the extent of the DAC Tokens transferred, and the transferee thereof shall be constituted as a Member of the DAC and entitled qua Member to all the benefits, and be subject to all the obligations, set out in this Constitution and in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens transferred to such transferee and, for the purposes of the Constitution, all unrealized and/or undistributed benefits and obligations accruing with respect to the transferred DAC Tokens shall be deemed assigned to the transferee as of the date of transfer."
[Constitution 1.8.3]
===
"3.10 Unregistering of Member: Where expressly permitted by the provisions of the Constitution, a Member may be unregistered by Special Resolution of the Custodian Board whereupon any or all benefits accruing to such Member may be blocked, restricted and/or rendered inoperable, including but not limited to Right to Vote in the DAC and Right to Distribution of Assets of the DAC PROVIDED ALWAYS no amendment, restatement, supplement or other modification of the Constitution, providing any additional basis for the unregistering of a Member, shall be effected other than by Extraordinary Resolution"
[Constitution 3.10]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'member,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'register-holder,

custodian of eosDAC

description::
"Custodians will be a group of 12 elected people who, with the best interests of the DAC in mind, will decide on expenditure and resource allocation of the DAC."
[https://eosdac.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360009811872-What-is-a-custodian]
===
"5.4 Each candidate for the position of Custodian must be a Member and may be an individual or a legal entity."
[Constitution 5.4]
===
"How do I become a custodian
After completing registration, members can register as a candidate for custodian by locking 1000 EOSDAC tokens."
[https://eosdac.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360010058651-How-do-I-become-a-custodian]
---
"Any member willing to stake 35,000 or more eosDAC tokens can run as a custodian"
[https://eosdac.io/why-join/]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'custodian!⇒eosDAC-custodian,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian,

EOS-account of custodian

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian'account,

votes of custodian

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian'votes,

staked-EOSDAC of custodian

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian'staked-EOSDAC,

custodian.SPECIFIC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian.specific,

specific::
* https://members.eosdac.io/vote-custodians,
===
* human,
* legal-entity,
===
* Yeates.Michael,
* Stokes.Luke,
* CREAMer, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/cream5eosdac,
* Won.SungHwan, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/angeljeffrey,
* Kim.Soyoung, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/soyoungkimsk,
* Johnson.Dallas, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/dallasjohnso,
* McKenna.Saro,
* Yang.Jeeho, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/yangjeeho123,
* Jeong.Dennis, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/eosdackorean,
* Allen.Rob, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/spaceinvader,
* Wang.Myra, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/khaleesiwang,
* IDOL-KWON, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/kwonwoosang1,
* Buck.Justin, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/jbucksteiner,
* Bindlish.Raman, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/investingwad,
* Lee.Changhyun, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/lcheosdackor,
* zhou.zicheng, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/eosdaciloveu,
* G-H, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/gyzdmmbtgyge, !!!
* PARK.JASON, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/ha3dqnbwgege,
* Astie.Jonathan, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/cryptdfwplay,
* Block-Tree-Team, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/eosblocktree,
* Lystang.Cory, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/ge4tonzxgege,
* Alcrypto, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/alcrypto1522,
* Bobcat-Weaver, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/gi4tomjygege,
* Muther.Mark-Alexander-Julius, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/sstarcitizen,
* Weisberg.Doug, https://members.eosdac.io/profile/dougweisberg,

custodian.Yeates.Michael

description::
"DACs are the future, lets help build them!
I am part of the launch team of eosDAC and have been serving as an interim custodian since launch.
Block Production
Since before the launch of the chain I have been involved in EOS testnets going right back to the days of the Superhero Network. Was heavily involved in the launch of the mainnet and I now have over 1 years experience running EOSIO software. Since launch I have been leading the block production team at eosDAC and we have consistently been within the top 21.
We currently have over 17 machines running our infrastructure and are running on 5 networks (including 2 live blockchains). I have been working closely with members of Block One to find and fix bugs in the EOSIO software and I earned the bug bounty for finding a bug in EOSIO which could crash any node.
Software Architect
I have been the Senior Developer working on the eosDAC suite of contracts, including the voting, token and supporting contracts. We have built the major contracts which support election, as well as designing the permissions layout and a nicely designed front-end to make it possible for non-technical people to be involved in running a DAC.
Community support
As part of our work in enabling DACs - I have been involved in supporting other DAPPs within the EOS ecosystem as a technical advisor. I was a mentor at the London EOS Hackathon in 2018, and regularly support and engage with the EOS community. I will always fight for the interests of the token holders when representing eosDAC and hope that we can be a strong voice in the future of the chain.
The Future
We have achieved a lot so far at eosDAC and it has been much harder than any of us imagined, but there is still a long way to go. I hope that we can continue the work done so far and prove that the concept of a DAC can work, even across international and cultural boundaries."
[https://members.eosdac.io/profile/mryeateshere]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian.Yeates.Michael,

custodian.Stokes.Luke

description::
"My Role With eosDAC
I was first contacted about joining eosDAC in March of 2018. Since then, I've been actively involved in all aspects of the DAC from block production, to technical management, to development and operational coordination. As a custodian, I'll approve worker proposals that directly add value to the DAC and use our funds wisely to build the foundations we need to be sustainable and enable DACs for many years to come.
Philosophy
I think on-chain governance with decentralized autonomous communities is one of the best paths forward for finding non-violent consensus and improving human well-being. I believe all human interactions should be voluntary and monopolies on violence and currency creation within geographic regions will become archaic relics of our past. Our circle of empathy is expanding towards cooperation and abundance. Technologies like EOS empower us all to function as efficient peer networks instead of dominating hierarchies. Non-violent communication, education, and blockchain consensus can help the right BPs secure and protect this collaborative commons. Entrepreneurship, specialization, economic freedom, and mutually beneficial exchange of value will increase prosperity for us all if EOS is run by the right block producers.
Background
I built my first websites in 1996, got a degree in computer science at UPENN in 2001, and eventually co-founded FoxyCart.com which I sold to my business partner in 2018 after ten successful years to focus full-time on projects in the cryptocurrency space. My first bitcoin purchase was in January of 2013 where I paid $50 to get 2.5 BTC. I have been a Steem Witness (block producer) since May of 2017 and joined the launch team of eosDAC in April of 2018. I like to be involved in and learn from many different cryptocurrency projects like BitShares and SmartCash. Since 2013, I have been educating people about cryptocurrency and explaining the complexities of blockchains in simple terms with projects like http://understandingblockchainfreedom.com/"
[https://members.eosdac.io/profile/lukeeosproxy]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian.Stokes.Luke,

account of Stokes.Luke

description::
* https://bloks.io/account/lukeeosproxy,
* https://lukestokes.info/,
* https://twitter.com/lukestokes,

info-resource of Stokes.Luke

addressWpg::
* https://members.eosdac.io/profile/lukeeosproxy,
* https://steemit.com/@lukestokes,
* http://understandingblockchainfreedom.com/,

custodian.McKenna.Saro

description::
"I am a member of the core senior team of eosDAC, a block producer on the EOS blockchain and decentralised autonomous community.
I am involved at the executive level with our open-source finance and strategy workstreams with respect to such matters as:
- our governance and legal relationships
- our team and team organisation
- how we encode our Constitution (https://github.com/eosdac/constitution/blob/master/constitution.md) into smart contracts, from a non-technical perspective
- how we, as a decentralised autonomous community - an entity not yet recognised in law - interact with the off-chain world, including how we contract for and pay for services
- how we identify and mitigate financial risk
- how we build the EOS ecosystem, including through supporting other DACs and blockchain projects, and how we evaluate those projects
- how we create open-source financial, workflow and HR systems within the DAC, so as to establish maximal alignment of interests and minimal information asymmetry (https://steemit.com/eosdac/@eosdac/eosdac-announces-first-approved-worker-proposals-prioritising-block-production-and-dac-toolkit)
I am a former investment banking and have had a successful independent corporate finance advisory practice for about 5 years, advising private equity, venture and corporate clients on M&A and strategy.
I was formerly regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and remain an inactive member on their register.
Having seen from within the systemic failure of the banking system during the credit crisis, and its notable failure to show remorse or implement systemic changes, I am passionately and personally committed to the implementation of radical freedom as a means of empowering more people."
[https://members.eosdac.io/profile/greentreesom]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-custodian.McKenna.Saro,

asset of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'asset,

revenue of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'revenue,

addressWpg::
* {2019-02-14} https://steemit.com/eosio/@eosdac/eosdac-reports-active-worker-proposals-revenue-and-expenditure-for-december-and-january,

expenditure of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'expenditure,

reserve-fund of eosDAC

description::
"10.2 The Custodian Board shall, before any Distribution of Assets, set aside out of the assets of the DAC, such assetsas the Custodian Board considers proper for the purposes of any reserve funds, and may invest such assets so set apart for any reserve funds in such manner as the Custodian Board may determine by Resolution PROVIDED ALWAYS that the reserve funds shall at all times, to the furthest extent possible, be sufficient to maintain the normal operations and affairs of the DAC for a period of no less than six (6) months."
[Constitution 10.2]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'reserve-fund,

output-asset of eosDAC

description::
· Deos-net--block-producer.
· DAC enabler.
===
"We are one of the 21 founding block producers on Worbli, the financial services side chain featuring user AML/KYC verification."
[https://steemit.com/eosio/@eosdac/eosdac-reports-active-worker-proposals-revenue-and-expenditure-for-october-and-november]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'output-asset,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'product,

Dchain-net of eosDAC

description::
· Deos-net.

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'Dchain-net,

EOS-account of eosDAC

description::
· dacauthority,
· eosdacserver, block producer account,
· eosdactokens, which has all the code for the EOSDAC token including member registration,
· eosdacthedack, holds the main funds of the-eosDAC,

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'account,

governance of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'governance!⇒eosDAC-govc,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-govc,

token of eosDAC

description::
· EOSDAC is the-governance-token of eosDAC.

name::
* McsEngl.DvEOSDAC, {2019-06-03},
* McsEngl.EOSDAC!⇒DvEOSDAC,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'token!⇒DvEOSDAC,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-govc'token!⇒DvEOSDAC,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-token!⇒DvEOSDAC,

constitution of eosDAC

description::
A decentralized autonomous community.
"A Decentralized Autonomous Community (DAC) is governed by its constitution, which is encoded in smart contracts on a blockchain."
[A Decentralized Autonomous Community (DAC) is governed by its constitution, which is encoded in smart contracts on a blockchain.]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'constitution,

Constitution-v4.2019-03-11 of eosDAC

description::
[A decentralized autonomous community]
Last Modified March 11th, 2019
version 4
Direct Link: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/eosdac/constitution/v4/constitution.md

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'constitution'version-4,

1. INTERPRETATION

In this Constitution, if not inconsistent with the context, the words and expressions shall bear the meanings set opposite them respectively.

Expression:
meaning.

1.1 Registration:
means the process prescribed by the DAC, pursuant to and/or in accordance with the Constitution, whereby DAC Tokens are activated or enabled through the use of prescribed software, as a method by which, and for the purposes of, accepting a DAC Token and constituting the holder thereof as a Member of the DAC and subject to the Constitution and the Terms and Conditions, to the extent of such DAC Tokens held from time to time

1.2 Blockchain:
or "distributed ledger technology" means a consensus of replicated, shared and synchronized digital data geographically spread across multiple sites, countries and institutions

1.3 Constitution:
This Constitution as originally framed or as from time to time amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified in accordance with the Constitution

1.4 Custodian:
means a member of the Custodian Board

1.5 Custodian Board:
or "Board" means the representative and governance board of the DAC that, save and except for the Genesis Board, shall consist of a maximum of twelve (12) persons appointed by the Members in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, which Custodian Board shall be first constituted upon the transfer of the DAC Tokens onto an EOSIO blockchain and the initialization of a voting Dapp, and which Board shall have such powers and duties as are set out in the Constitution

1.6 Custodian Proposal:
means a proposal submitted by a Custodian to the Custodian Board for consideration and determination by the Custodian Board

1.7 DAC:
the eosDAC decentralized autonomous community of Members governed by and administered in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Constitution, which community of Members shall be collectively referred to as the "eosDAC"

1.8 DAC Token:
means an eosDAC Token, the acceptance of which shall constitute the holder thereof as a Member of the DAC, represent the membership of such holder of the DAC and facilitate the automated governance of the DAC, all subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution

1.9 DAPP:
means a decentralized application running on a Blockchain

1.10 Extraordinary Resolution:
means a resolution, determination or decision consented to by not less than 83% of the Custodians constituting the Custodian Board casting votes on such resolution, determination or decision

1.11 Genesis Member:
means BlockMaker Ltd, a company duly incorporated under the Anguilla International Business Companies Act (c. I20)

1.12 Genesis Board:
means BlockMaker Ltd, in the capacity of, and which shall be deemed, the Custodian Board pending the constitution of the first Custodian Board pursuant to and in accordance with the Constitution

1.13 Member:
means a member of the DAC, entitled, qua Member, to all the benefits and subject to all the obligations set out in the Constitution

1.14 Nomination Directive:
means rules and regulations, approved by Special Resolution, as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, prescribing the procedure, qualifications (including staking) and mechanism for the nomination, election and appointment of Custodians to the Custodian Board

1.15 Person:
means an individual, a corporation, a trust, the estate of a deceased individual, a partnership or an unincorporated association of persons

1.16 Proposal:
means a proposal submitted by a Member to the Custodian Board for consideration and determination by the Custodian Board, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and shall include but not be limited to proposals on bounties, technical choices, services providers, contingency levels and allocations of tokens raised through block production by or through the DAC

1.17 Quorum:
when used in relation to Members of the DAC means the minimum number of DAC Tokens linked to votes cast by Members, in relation to any matter prescribed by the Constitution to be subject to the determination by Members, required to render such vote valid, and when used in relation to the Custodian Board means the minimum number of Custodians present and able to cast votes, in relation to any matter prescribed by the Constitution to be subject to the determination by the Custodian Board, required to render such vote valid

1.18 Proposal Directive:
means rules and regulations, approved by Special Resolution, as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, prescribing the subject matter of, and the procedure, qualifications and mechanism for, the submission of Proposals by Members or Custodians to the Custodian Board for their consideration and determination

1.19 Resolution:
means a resolution, determination or decision consented to by a majority of Custodians of the Custodian Board casting votes on such resolution, determination or decision

1.20 Special Resolution:
means a resolution, determination or decision consented to by not less than 75% of Custodians of the Custodian Board casting votes on such resolution, determination or decision

1.21 Stake:
when used in reference to the DAC tokens refers to the mechanism by which DAC tokens are rendered non transferrable by the holder thereof, and upon such terms (including slashing clauses) and for such period, as prescribed by any Nomination Directive, Proposal Directive or Voting Directive and/or pursuant to the Constitution

1.22 Terms & Conditions:
means the terms and conditions relating to the DAC and DAC Tokens, attached to the Schedule to this Constitution and incorporated into this Constitution and from time to time

1.23 Tokens:
means any cryptographically secured digital representation of a set of rights, including smart contracts, provided on a digital platform and includes any fractional part thereof

1.24 Token Distribution:
means the initial distribution of the DAC Tokens by the Genesis Member to specified persons, or their assignees or transferees, inviting such persons to accept and hold DAC Tokens, gratis, and to become members of the DAC

1.25 Voting Directive:
means rules and regulations, approved by Special Resolution, as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, prescribing the subject matter of (where applicable), and the procedure, qualifications and mechanism for, voting by Members and Custodians, including but not limited to quorums, consensus and staking of DAC Tokens

1.26 Website:
means the website published and maintained by or on behalf of the DAC and hosted at https://eosdac.io/ or such other URL prescribed by Resolution.

1.27 Written:
or any term of like import includes words typewritten, printed, painted, engraved, lithographed, photographed or represented or reproduced by any mode of representing or reproducing words in a visible form, including telex, telegram, facsimile, cable or other form of writing produced by electronic communication

1.28 Whenever the singular or plural number, or the masculine, feminine or neuter gender is used in this Constitution, it shall equally, where the context admits, include the others

1.29 A reference in this Constitution to voting in relation to Members shall be construed as a reference to voting by Members to the extent of the number of DAC Tokens held by such Members, with the votes being allocated to the number of such DAC Tokens being counted as voted and not the number of Members who actually voted

1.30 A reference to money in this Constitution is, unless otherwise stated, a reference to the fiat currency of any nationality

2. CORE PRINCIPLES

2.1 The DAC shall be a decentralized autonomous community governed by this Constitution and administered through the medium of blockchain technology.

2.2 The DAC shall be founded on the following core principles:

   2.2.1 Nurturing the Ecosystem:
The primary objective of the DAC shall be to nurture and support the EOSIO ecosystem

   2.2.2 Excellence of Service:
DAC shall always strive to ensure that it is able to produce or procure the continuous production of blocks required by EOSIO software driven blockchains.

   2.2.3 Openness and Transparency:
All decisions made by the DAC governance structures and all operations of the DAC will be open and transparent.

   2.2.4 Support of EOSIO Communities Worldwide:
DAC shall engage with the communities, listen and support projects that benefit all EOSIO blockchain communities.

   2.2.5 Fairness:
DAC shall treat all members fairly, reward contributions appropriately and not seek unmerited profits.
No one member should have less information about a decision than others.

   2.2.6 Independence:
DAC will not seek any stake in, or exert undue influence over, other block producers and shall take appropriate measures to protect its own independence.

   2.2.7 Respect of the EOS Constitution:
DAC shall respect the EOS blockchain(s) on which the DAC operates:
To the extent that each EOSIO blockchain, for which DAC produces or procures continuous production of blocks, will have its own constitution or equivalent organizational instrument, DAC shall use its best efforts to adhere to such constitutions or organizational documents whilst acting in the interest of all chain token holders.

2.3 To the furthest extent permissible the provisions of the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the core principles.

3. DAC TOKENS AND MEMBERSHIP

3.1 Nature: DAC Tokens shall, upon registration, constitute and represent the holder thereof as a Member of the DAC, to the extent of DAC Tokens held from time to time, and shall enable the automated governance of the DAC, all subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

3.2 Number: An initial number of 1, 200, 000, 000 (One Billion and Two Hundred Million) DAC Tokens shall be made available for distribution by the Genesis Member at the Token Distribution, and thereafter the number of tokens shall be determined, or be determinable, in the manner prescribed by the Custodian Board, from time to time, by Extraordinary Resolution.

3.3 Membership: DAC Tokens shall, upon registration, constitute and represent the holder thereof, from time to time, as a Member of the DAC, entitled qua Member to all the benefits, and subject to all the obligations, set out in this Constitution and in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens held by such holder, from time to time, PROVIDED ALWAYS that Membership shall be inseparably linked to possession and control of the DAC Tokens and should any holder thereof lose possession or control of or over any such DAC Tokens, such holder shall be deemed immediately terminated as a Member and shall not be entitled qua Member to any benefits, or subject to any obligations, as aforesaid, to the extent of the DAC Tokens over which possession or control was lost.

3.4 Benefits of Members: The DAC Tokens shall entitle the holder thereof and from time to time, qua Member of the DAC, to the following rights in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens held by such holder as measured against the total number of outstanding DAC Tokens:

(a) Right to Benefits to Members of the DAC prescribed by and pursuant to the Constitution, which right shall be governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(b) Right to Vote in the DAC on any matter requiring or permitting a vote of member's of the DAC prescribed by and pursuant to the Constitution, which right shall be governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(c) Right to Distribution of Assets of the DAC, required or permitted to be distributed to Members of the DAC pursuant to the Constitution, which right shall be governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(d) Right to Ownership of Assets of the DAC, in common with each other Member and inseparable from Membership, which right shall be subject to, governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(e) Right on Dissolution of DAC to distribution of any surplus assets of the DAC, which right shall be subject to, governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

PROVIDED ALWAYS that, save and except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, no benefits of or accruing to Members, or any part thereof, under this provision, may be amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified other than by Extraordinary Resolution.

3.5 Obligations of Members: The DAC Tokens shall subject the holder thereof and from time to time, qua Member of the DAC, to the following obligations in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens held by such holder as measured against the total number of outstanding DAC Tokens:

(a) Obligation for Liabilities of the DAC, in common with each other Member and inseparable from Membership, which obligation shall be governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

(b) Obligation of Governance by the DAC, binding each Member, and each Member's property rights held in common with each other Member, to governance by, and administration in accordance with, the provisions of the Constitution with respect to any matter relating to the DAC Tokens, the DAC and/or the Constitution.
PROVIDED ALWAYS that, save and except as otherwise provided by the Constitution, no obligation accruing to Members, or any part thereof, under this provision may be amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified other than by Extraordinary Resolution

3.6 No Redemption: DAC Tokens shall not be redeemable at the instance of the holder of a DAC Token or the DAC.

3.7 Voluntary Cancellation of DAC Tokens: DAC Tokens may be "burnt" at the instance of any holder thereof, subject to and in accordance with this Constitution.
Members wishing to "burn" DAC Tokens (or any part thereof) shall be permitted to do so in accordance with the "burn transaction" prescribed by the DAC.
Upon "burning" of a DAC Token, the membership of the DAC linked to such DAC Token shall expire immediately and the holder thereof shall have no further entitlements qua member to any benefit, and shall be subject to no further obligations, linked to the "burnt" DAC Token, which rights and obligations shall stand assigned and/or distributed amongst the remaining DAC Tokens.

3.8 Transfer of DAC Tokens:

   3.8.1 DAC Tokens shall be transferable by any holder thereof by delivery of possession and control thereof.

   3.8.2 Any transfer of DAC Tokens shall be completed by registration of such DAC Tokens by the transferee thereof and in accordance with the Constitution.

   3.8.3 Upon transfer of any DAC Token, the transferor thereof shall cease to be a Member of the DAC, to the extent of the DAC Tokens transferred, and the transferee thereof shall be constituted as a Member of the DAC and entitled qua Member to all the benefits, and be subject to all the obligations, set out in this Constitution and in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens transferred to such transferee and, for the purposes of the Constitution, all unrealized and/or undistributed benefits and obligations accruing with respect to the transferred DAC Tokens shall be deemed assigned to the transferee as of the date of transfer.

3.9 Member Information and Documentation: Upon request or notification each Member shall immediately provide information and documents that the Custodian Board, in its sole discretion, deems necessary to comply with the laws, regulations or rules of or in relation to any applicable jurisdiction or blockchain, including but not limited to judicial decrees, order, processes or arbitral awards.
Such documents or information shall include, but not be limited to, certified copies of Member's passport, utility bills, government identification cards, sworn statements and information and documentation relating to persons or entities affiliated with Member.
Each Member expressly and irrevocably consents to the disclosure of such information and documentation, and the recording or making of copies thereof, required for compliance with any laws, regulations or rules of or in relation to any applicable jurisdiction or blockchain.
Failure by a Member to immediately comply with any such request for information or documentation may result in measures taken against such Member, including but not limited to the unregistering of such Member, in accordance with the Constitution.

3.10 Unregistering of Member: Where expressly permitted by the provisions of the Constitution, a Member may be unregistered by Special Resolution of the Custodian Board whereupon any or all benefits accruing to such Member may be blocked, restricted and/or rendered inoperable, including but not limited to Right to Vote in the DAC and Right to Distribution of Assets of the DAC PROVIDED ALWAYS no amendment, restatement, supplement or other modification of the Constitution, providing any additional basis for the unregistering of a Member, shall be effected other than by Extraordinary Resolution.

3.11 Joint Holders: If several persons exercise joint possession and control of any DAC Tokens, then such persons shall be constituted as joint Members of the DAC and any one of such persons may exercise and/or give receipt for any benefit linked to such DAC Tokens held by such joint holders and such joint owners shall be jointly and severally subject to the obligations linked to such DAC Tokens.

3.12 No Partnership, Joint Venture or Agency: Nothing in this Constitution and no action taken by any Member shall constitute, or be deemed to constitute a partnership, joint venture or any other association between the Members, and no action taken by any Member pursuant to this Constitution or otherwise shall constitute, or be deemed to constitute, any Member as the agent of any other Member or the DAC for any purpose whatsoever and no Member has, pursuant to this Constitution or otherwise, any authority or power to bind or to contract or to otherwise act in the name of or on behalf of any other Member or the DAC, all save and except as expressly provided in the Constitution and to the extent applicable with respect to the Custodian Board.

4. PROPOSALS AND VOTING OF MEMBERS

4.1 Each Member shall be permitted to vote on the appointment of Custodians to the Custodian Board, and on any other matters prescribed by or pursuant to the Constitution, in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens held by such Member and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

4.2 Subject to the provisions of any Voting Directive, a quorum for the purposes of any vote of Members prescribed by the Constitution shall be 2% of the outstanding DAC Tokens, from time to time, save and except that a quorum with respect to the vote of Members for the formation of the first Custodian Board, superseding the Genesis Board, shall be 15% of the outstanding DAC Tokens ("Activation Threshold").

4.3 Voting by Members on the appointment of Custodians to the Custodian Board, and on any other matters prescribed by the Constitution, shall be in accordance with the procedure, qualifications and mechanism for voting, including but not limited to quorums, consensus, and staking of DAC Tokens as prescribed by Voting Directive from time to time.

4.5 Any Member shall be entitled to submit Proposals for the consideration and determination of the Custodian Board in accordance with the subject matter, procedure, qualifications and mechanism, including but not limited to staking of DAC Tokens, as prescribed by Proposal Directive from time to time.

4.6 The usage of any DAC Tokens for the purposes of submission of Proposals and voting of Members, or any other purpose prescribed by the Constitution, shall be deemed the usage by the holder thereof, whether or not such usage was effected by such holder, any servant or agent thereof or any other person whether authorized or unauthorized.

4.7 Members may be permitted to vote by proxy in the manner prescribed, and subject to, any Voting Directive from time to time.

5. CUSTODIAN BOARD

5.1 Until such time as the first Custodian Board is constituted, the Genesis Member shall be deemed, and shall have the powers and duties of, the Custodian Board for the purposes of the Constitution.

5.2 The Custodian Board shall be elected by vote of the Members, with the twelve (12) candidates receiving the highest number of votes being appointed to serve on the Custodian Board ("Appointment Event").

5.3 Each Custodian shall be entitled to cast one (1) vote with regard to any Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution in relation to any Proposal or Custodian Proposal, or any other matter prescribed by the Constitution to be determined by the Custodian Board.

5.4 Each candidate for the position of Custodian must be a Member and may be an individual or a legal entity.

5.5 Custodians shall be nominated, elected and appointed in accordance with the procedure, qualifications and mechanism prescribed by Nomination Directive, from time to time, which Nomination Directive shall include, but shall not be limited to, provisions requiring each candidate to make a declaration specifying the emoluments that such candidate shall require if appointed, up to a maximum amount 50 EOS for each one week term, ("Candidate Emoluments Declaration"), such maximum amount being subject to change by Special Resolution.

5.6 Each Custodian shall hold office for the term of one (1) calendar week, commencing at midnight on the date of appointment and concluding at midnight on the final day of such calendar week, save and except that the term for the first Custodian Board, superseding the Genesis Board, shall be deemed to commence at midnight of the day of attainment of the Activation Threshold.

5.7 In the case of a Custodian who is an individual the term of office for such member shall terminate on the individual's death, resignation or removal.
The bankruptcy, resignation or removal of a corporate Custodian shall terminate the term of office of such Custodian.

5.8 Emoluments of each Custodian during a term shall be the mean of the Candidate Emoluments Declaration of Custodians appointed for such term divided by twelve (12), and shall be paid to each Custodian automatically and at the expiration of each term held by such Custodian or as otherwise provided by Nomination Directive.

5.9 A Custodian may be removed from office, with or without cause, by Special Resolution of the Custodian Board.

5.10 A Custodian may resign his office by giving written notice of his resignation to the Custodian Board and the resignation shall have effect from the date the notice is received by the Custodian Board or from such later date as may be specified in the notice.

5.11 A vacancy in the Custodian Board shall immediately, and without more, be filled, for the remainder of the term, by the appointment of the Candidate holding the highest number of votes on the candidate voting roster, but not currently serving as a Custodian, at the time of the creation of the vacancy ("Replacement Custodian").

5.12 The Custodian Board may determine by Resolution to maintain a record, in such form determined by the Custodian Board, of Custodians containing:

   5.12.1 the name, contact details (including email addresses) and/or addresses of the persons appointed as Custodians;

   5.12.2 the date on which each person whose name is entered in the record of Custodians was appointed as a Custodian; and

   5.12.3 the date on which each person named as a Custodian ceased to be a Custodian of the Custodian Board.

6. POWER OF CUSTODIAN BOARD

6.1 The operations and affairs of the DAC, including but not limited to the governance and administration of assets and liabilities of the DAC, shall be vested, determined and managed by and through the Custodian Board, as constituted from time to time, which shall hold and exercise all such powers pursuant to and in accordance with this Constitution, and for the purposes aforesaid, the Custodian Board may do all acts, matters and things, and execute all contracts, instruments, deeds or other document, whatsoever and wheresoever, for and on behalf of the DAC and the Members, and each of them, thereof PROVIDED ALWAYS that any such action shall be considered by the Custodian Board by means of a Proposal or Custodian Proposal and determined by, and effected pursuant to, Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution of the Custodian Board.

6.2 The aggregate and collective rights of Members to and to determine the operations and affairs of the DAC, held in common with each other Member of the DAC, shall be and shall be deemed the operations and affairs of the DAC and shall be governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

6.3 The aggregate and undistributed assets and liabilities of Members, held in common with each other Member of the DAC, from time to time, shall be and shall be deemed the assets and liabilities of the DAC and shall be subject to, governed by and administered in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

6.4 Any action or omission by the Custodian Board and each Custodian thereof, pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, relating to the operations and affairs of the DAC shall be and shall be deemed authorized by, on behalf of and binding upon each Member of the DAC, in common with each other Member, regardless of any assent or dissent by such Member to such action or omission.

6.5 Any acquisition or disposition of, or any other action or omission relating to, the assets and liabilities of the DAC, by the Custodian Board and each Custodian thereof and pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, shall be deemed authorized by, on behalf of and binding upon each Member of the DAC, in common with each other Member, regardless of any assent or dissent by such Member to such acquisition, disposition, action or omission.

6.6 The Custodian Board may, by Resolution, appoint any person, including a person who is a Custodian to act as agent for the Custodian Board and/or the DAC.
The Resolution appointing such agent may authorize the agent to appoint one or more substitutes or delegates to exercise some or all of the powers conferred on the agent by the Custodian Board.

6.7 Without prejudice to the appointment of a Replacement Custodian, the continuing Custodians may act notwithstanding any vacancy in the Custodian Board, save that where the number of Custodians is reduced below the number fixed by or pursuant to this Constitution as the necessary quorum for the Custodian Board, and no Replacement Custodian is available, the continuing Custodian or Custodians may appoint Custodians to fill any vacancy that has arisen by Resolution.

6.8 All cheques, promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other negotiable instruments, and all receipts for value, whether in the form of money, cryptocurrencies or any other store of value, paid to the DAC or Custodian Board shall be signed, drawn, accepted, endorsed or otherwise executed, as the case may be, in such manner as shall from time to time be determined by Resolution.

6.9 To the furthest extent permitted by any applicable law, any claims, demands, liabilities or any other recourse whatsoever, arising out or related to any act or omission of the DAC, the Custodian Board or any servant or agent thereof, shall be limited to the assets of the DAC, as exist from time to time, and there shall be no claim, demand, liability or any other recourse against or permitted against the Custodian Board or any Member of the DAC.

6.10 Any contract, agreement or other arrangement entered into by or on behalf of the DAC, by or through the Custodian Board or in any other manner permitted by this Constitution shall limit and restrict any claims, demands, liabilities or any other recourse whatsoever thereon to the assets of the DAC, as exist from time to time, and there shall be no claim, demand, liability or any other recourse against or permitted against the Custodian Board or any Member of the DAC.

6.11 The Custodian Board may from time to time and at any time by power of attorney appoint any company, firm or person or body of persons whether appointed directly or indirectly by the Custodian Board, to be the attorney or attorneys of the Custodian Board for such purposes and with such powers, authorities and discretions (not exceeding those vested in or exercisable by the Custodian Board under this Constitution) and for such period and subject to such conditions as the Custodian Board may think fit and any such power of attorney may contain such provisions for the protection and convenience of persons dealing with such attorney or attorneys as the Custodian Board may think fit and may also authorize any such attorney or attorneys to delegate all or any powers, authorities and discretions vested in them.

6.12 The Custodian Board may be Extraordinary Resolution prescribe, and amend, restate, supplement or otherwise modify, a code of conduct for Custodians ("Custodian Code of Conduct") including provisions for the removal of Custodians who do not conform to such Code of Conduct, by the remaining Custodian Board by Special Resolution.

7. PROCEEDINGS OF CUSTODIAN BOARD

7.1 The Custodians of the Custodian Board may meet, whether in person, by video or audio communication, electronic mail/messaging or such other or further means of communication, at such times and in such manner and at such places as the Custodians may determine to be necessary or desirable.

7.2 A Custodian shall be deemed to be present at a meeting of Custodians of the Custodian Board if he participates in person, by video or audio communication, electronic mail/messaging or such other or further means of communication that allows all other Custodians participating in the meeting to be able to view, hear or otherwise interact with each other's communication in real time.

7.3 A Custodian shall be given not less than twenty four (24) hours notice of meetings of Custodians of the Custodian Board, but such meeting of Custodians held without twenty four (24) hours notice having been given to all Custodians shall be valid if all the Custodians entitled to vote at such meeting who do notattend, waive notice of the meeting; and for this purpose, the presence or vote of a Custodian at the meeting shall be deemed to constitute waiver on his part.
The inadvertent failure to give notice of a meeting to a Custodian, or the fact that a Custodian has not received the notice, does not invalidate the meeting.

7.4 All proceedings of the Custodian Board shall be conducted in the English language.

7.5 Voting by Custodians with respect to any Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution determining a Proposal, Custodian Proposal or on any other matter prescribed by the Constitution, shall be in accordance with the subject matter, procedure, qualifications and mechanism for voting, including but not limited to quorums, consensus, and any staking of DAC Tokens, prescribed by Voting Directive from time to time and which may or may not require a meeting of the Custodian Board.

7.6 Any Custodian shall be entitled to submit Custodian Proposals, relating to the operations and affairs of the DAC and for the consideration and determination of the Custodian Board, in accordance with the subject matter, procedure, qualifications and mechanism, including but not limited to staking of DAC Tokens, as prescribed by Proposal Directive from time to time.

7.7 Unless otherwise stated in the Constitution or any Voting Directive, from time to time, all matters for determination by the Custodian Board shall be determined by simple Resolution.

7.8 Immediately upon determination of any matter by Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution, the Custodian Board shall publish on the blockchain (a) whether or not the matter has been approved or rejected by Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution (b) the number of votes in favour and against in reaching such determination and (c) the vote of each Custodian with respect to such Proposal.

7.9 Subject to the provisions of any Voting Directive, a quorum for any vote by the Custodian Board with respect to any Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution shall be eight (8) Custodians able to cast votes in the manner prescribed by Voting Directive.

7.10 The Custodian Board may, by Resolution, cause the following records ("Records") to be kept:

   7.10.1 minutes of any meetings of Custodians;

   7.10.2 copies of all Resolutions, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolutions by the Custodian Board; and

   7.10.3 such other accounts and records as the Custodian Board considered necessary or desirable inorder to reflect the financial position of the Custodian Board or DAC.

7.11 The Records shall be kept at the at such place or places, and in such form (including electronic form) as the Custodian Board, from time to time, determines by Resolution.

7.12 The Custodian Board may, by a Resolution, designate one or more committees, each consisting of one or more Custodians to do such things, make such investigations or inquiries and make such reports as determined by the Custodian Board by Resolution.

7.13 The Custodian Board may, but shall not be required to, by Special Resolution determine, from time to time, that specific issues substantially affecting or capable of substantially affecting the DAC shall be put before the DAC for determination by vote of Members ("Members Referendum Proposal").

8. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

8.1 No agreement or transaction between the DAC and one or more of its Custodians, or any person in which any Custodian has a financial interest or to whom any Custodian is related, is void or voidable for this reason only or by reason only that the Custodian participates in any voting on such agreement or transaction and that the vote of such Custodian counted for that purpose PROVIDED ALWAYS that the material facts of the interest of the relevant Custodian shall be disclosed in good faith to the other Custodians prior to any vote with respect to the agreement or transaction.

9. INDEMNIFICATION

9.1 Subject to the limitations hereinafter provided, the Custodian Board shall, out of the assets of the DAC, indemnify against all expenses, including legal fees, and against all judgments, fines, damages and amounts paid insettlement and reasonably incurred in connection with legal, administrative or investigative proceedings any person who:

   9.1.1 is or was a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed proceedings, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, by reason of the fact that the person is or was a Custodian or an officer, consultant, advisor, affiliate, servant, agent or service provider, past, present or future, of the DAC or Custodian Board.

   9.1.2 is or was a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed proceedings, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, by reason of the fact that the person is a Member of the DAC and such proceedings is or was alleged or premised on the basis of joint or several liability of such Member for any act or omission of the DAC or Custodian Board.

9.2 The Custodian Board may restrict indemnification of any person on the prerequisite that the person acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the DAC or Custodian Board and was not aware that his conduct was unlawful.

9.3 The decision of the Custodian Board as to whether the person acted honestly and in good faith and with a view to the best interests of the DAC or Custodian Board is, in the absence of fraud, sufficient for the purposes of this Constitution, unless aquestion of law is involved.

9.4 In furtherance of the indemnification of any person, the Governing Board shall provide moneys, or any other medium of value, in advance, for the purposes of meeting any legal fees and expenses required in the defending or prosecuting any legal, administrative or investigative proceedings by or against the indemnified person.

9.5 The Custodian Board may purchase and maintain insurance in relation to any obligation to indemnify any person pursuant to the Constitution.

9.6 The Custodian Board shall establish an indemnification reserve, in such amounts, in such currencies or stores of value and to be funded or accumulated in such manner, as is determined by the Custodian Board by Resolution.

10. DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS TO MEMBERS

10.1 The Custodian Board shall by Resolution and from time to time determine that any assets of the DAC, including but not limited to cryptocurrencies, moneys or other stores of value, received by or on behalf of the DAC or Custodian Board be distributed to the Members of the DAC in proportion to the number of DAC Tokens held by such Members ("Distribution of Assets").

10.2 The Custodian Board shall, before any Distribution of Assets, set aside out of the assets of the DAC, such assets as the Custodian Board considers proper for the purposes of any reserve funds, and may invest such assets so set apart for any reserve funds in such manner as the Custodian Board may determine by Resolution PROVIDED ALWAYS that the reserve funds shall at all times, to the furthest extent possible, be sufficient to maintain the normal operations and affairs of the DAC for a period of no less than six (6) months.

10.3 No Distribution of Assets shall be made unless the Custodian Board determines that immediately after such Distribution of Assets the DAC or Custodian Board will be able to satisfy the liabilities of the DAC (including any reserve funds) as they come due in the ordinary course of its operations and affairs, and the realisable value of the assets of the DAC will not be less than the sum of its total liabilities.
In the absence of fraud, the decision of the Custodian Board as to the realisable value of the assets of the DAC shall be conclusive.

10.4 No Distribution of Assets shall bear interest as against the DAC.

10.5 Notwithstanding any other provision of the Constitution, the entitlement of any Member to a Distribution of Assets, as effected by the DAC or Custodian Board from time to time, shall be conditional on such Member electing to receive such Distribution of Assets, in accordance with the procedure and mechanism prescribed by the Custodian Board, from time to time and failing such election by the time of any Distribution of Assets, the entitlement of such Member shall be deemed to have been irrevocably waived and the relevant assets shall be distributed in lieu thereof amongst the remaining Members of the DAC.

10.6 Distribution of Assets may be in specie or in any other medium of value that the Custodian Board deems fit.

11. ACCOUNTING

11.1 All decisions, transactions and/or accounting for the DAC shall be viewable by all Members on the Website and/or on the blockchain hosting the DAC.

12. AUDIT

12.1 The Custodian Board may, but shall not be required to, call for the accounts to be examined by auditors and upon such terms and conditions, including appointment of auditors, as the Custodian Board may determinate by Special Resolution.

13. NOTICES

13.1 Any agreements, notices, disclosures and other communications provided or to be provided to Member pursuant to the Constitution may be provided to Member or Custodian by publication on the Website or dissemination in electronic form or in such other form or manner as determined by Resolution of the Custodian Board from time to time and, immediately upon such publication or dissemination, Member or Custodian shall be deemed to have notice thereof.

14. RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES

14.1 In any case (if any) where under the Constitution any act or thing may be done by, on behalf of, or in relation to the DAC either by vote of Members or by Resolution of the Custodian Board and there is a difference, then the determination of the Members shall prevail.

15. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

15.1 Informal Dispute Resolution:
Members and Custodians shall cooperate in good faith to resolve any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, relating to or in connection with the Constitution or the DAC, including with respect to the formation, applicability, breach, termination, validity or enforceability thereof ("Dispute").
If the parties to any Dispute are unable to resolve a Dispute within ninety (90) days of notice of such Dispute being received by all parties thereof, such Dispute shall be finally settled by Binding Arbitration, as defined hereinafter.

15.2 Binding Arbitration:
Any Dispute not resolved within 90 days as set forth hereinbefore shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) rules in effect at the time of the arbitration, except as they may be modified herein or by mutual agreement of the parties to such arbitration.
The number of arbitrators shall be one, who shall be selected by the parties to the arbitration.
The seat, or legal place, of arbitration shall be London, England.
The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be English.
The governing law, for the purposes only of the interpretation and constructions of the provisions of the Constitution, and the contractual relations created thereby, shall be the laws of Anguilla.
The arbitration award shall be final and binding on the parties thereto ("Binding Arbitration").
Each Member and Custodian undertakes to carry out any award without delay and waive its right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.
Judgment upon the award may be entered by any court having jurisdiction thereof or having jurisdiction over the relevant party or its assets.
Without prejudice to any indemnification provision of the Constitution, each party to arbitration shall pay their respective attorneys' fees and expenses.

15.3 No Class Arbitrations, Class Actions or Representative Actions:
Any dispute arising out of or related to the Constitution shall be personal to the parties to the arbitration and shall not be brought as a class arbitration, class action or any other type of representative proceeding.
There shall be no class arbitration or arbitration in which an individual attempts to resolve a dispute as a representative of another individual or group of individuals.
Further, and to the furthest extent permitted by applicable law, a dispute cannot be brought as a class or other type of representative action, whether within or outside of arbitration, or on behalf of any other individual or group of individuals.

15.4 Without prejudice to any other limitation of liability, disclaimer, waiver or release prescribed by the Constitution or any part thereof (including but not limited to the Terms and Conditions), and to the furthest extent permitted by any applicable law, any claims, demands, actions, damages or proceedings by any Member against the DAC, Custodian Board (or any servant or agent thereof), or any other Member, with respect to any action or omission of such persons and arising out of or related to the Constitution shall be limited to the assets of the DAC, as exist from time to time.

16. VOLUNTARY WINDING UP AND DISSOLUTION

16.1 Subject to any provision to the contrary in the Constitution the DAC may voluntarily commence to wind up and dissolve by Extraordinary Resolution of the Custodian Board.
Upon the dissolution of the DAC and distribution of any net assets of the DAC to Members, each Member shall be immediately and without more released from any obligation, and no longer entitled to any benefit, pursuant to this Constitution.

17. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION

17.1 Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Custodian Board may by Special Resolution make, amend, restate, supplement or otherwise modify any provision of this Constitution and same shall thereupon and without more be effective and binding on or against each Member of the DAC.

18. TERMS AND CONDITIONS

18.1 The Terms and Conditions issued by Genesis Member at the Token Distribution shall be incorporated herein and form a part of this Constitution.
The Custodian Board may by Special Resolution make, amend, restate, supplement or otherwise modify any provision of the Terms and Conditions and same shall thereupon and without more be effective and binding on or against each Member of the DAC.

19. APPLICABLE LAW

19.1 The governing law for the purposes only of the interpretation and constructions of the provisions of the Constitution, and the contractual relations created thereby, shall be the laws of Anguilla.

20. SEVERABILITY

20.1 The Constitution, including any exhibits attached hereto, materials incorporated herein by reference and material issued pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous agreements and understandings, both written and oral, between such parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, including, without limitation, any public or other statements or presentations made by any Genesis Member, DAC or any member, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parent, subsidiary affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof, save and except for the Terms and Conditions.

20.2 If any of the provisions of the Constitution are deemed to be invalid, void or unenforceable under any applicable law, the remaining provisions shall continue in full force and effect.

20.3 By acceptance of DAC Tokens, whether at the Token Distribution or upon transfer from any holder of DAC Tokens or usage of DAC Tokens, Member expressly acknowledges, accepts, agrees and shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the Constitution and the Terms and Conditions, each as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time.

21. BINDING AGREEMENT

21.1 The provisions of the Constitution shall constitute the agreement by and between each Member and each other Member of the DAC, from time to time, inter se.

SCHEDULE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS

These Terms and Conditions (the "T&C") apply to each holder of the eosDAC token(s) and/or member of the eosDAC decentralized autonomous community.
PLEASE READ THESE TERMS CAREFULLY BEFORE ACCEPTING EOSDAC TOKENS AND/OR PARTICIPATING IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE EOSDAC.
THE T&C AFFECTS THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF HOLDERS OF EOSDAC TOKENS AND/OR MEMBERS OF THE EOSDAC, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WAIVERS OF RIGHTS AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
IF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY DOES NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS HEREOF, SUCH PERSON OR ENTITY MUST NOT ACCEPT THE EOSDAC TOKEN(S).

By accepting and holding eosDAC token(s), holder thereof agrees with each other holder of eosDAC token(s), from time to time and inter se, to be bound by the T&C, and shall be bound by the terms and conditions thereof, along with such further or other terms and conditions incorporated by reference in the T&C including but not limited to the Constitution (as hereinafter defined).
The acceptance and holding of eosDAC token(s) is made expressly subject to this T&C.

NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the mutual promises contained in this T&C it is hereby agreed as follows:

Binding Agreement

1. The following terms and conditions constitute the agreement ("Agreement") by and between any person or entity accepting and holding an eosDAC token (or any fractional part thereof) ("Member"), and each other person or entity accepting or holding an eosDAC token (or any fractional part thereof), inter se.
By accepting and holding an eosDAC token, or any fractional part thereof ("Token"), the Member hereof agrees to be, and shall be constituted, without more, as a member of the eosDAC decentralized autonomous community ("eosDAC") and shall be bound by the T&C, as amended from time to time.
The Member is aware that eosDAC may change the T&C at any time and in any manner, in accordance with the constitution governing the organization, rights and liabilities of the eosDAC and the members thereof ("Constitution").

2. By accepting a Token, Member confirms that it is the holder of the Token, a member of the eosDAC and has read, understands and agrees to the T&C.
A person or entity shall indicate their acceptance of a Token by:

(a) In the case of any initial recipient of a Token (or assignee/transferee thereof), pursuant to the Token Distribution (as defined hereinafter), by registering the Token through the eosDAC software.

(b) In any other case, by accepting the transfer or assignment of a Token from a holder of Tokens and/or registering the Token through the eosDAC software.

(c) In either case, and in any event, by any usage of Tokens including but not limited to exercise of voting rights or receipt of distributions of assets.

3. BlockMaker Ltd has prepared a website, available at www.eosdac.io ("Website"), describing the proposed activities of eosDAC and the mechanisms through which such activities shall be conducted.
By accepting and holding a Token, Member confirms that it has read and understands the Website.

The eosDAC

4. eosDAC is an decentralized autonomous community governed by the Constitution of eosDAC and administered through the medium of blockchain technology.
The use of a blockchain technology enables eosDAC to be decentralized and governed, in accordance with its Constitution, on an automated basis.
The terms and conditions of the Constitution are incorporated by reference into the T&C and shall be binding on each member of the eosDAC, inter se.
By accepting and holding a Token, Member also confirms that it has read, understands and agrees to the terms and conditions of the Constitution and the rules of governance of the eosDAC.

The eosDAC Tokens ("Token")

5. BlockMaker Ltd shall distribute an initial supply of 1, 200, 000, 000 (One Billion and Two Hundred Million) Tokens to specified persons or entities, inviting such persons or entities, or their transferees or assignees, ("Token Distribution") to accept and hold such Tokens, gratis, and to become a member of the eosDAC.

6. Tokens are not redeemable by Member or eosDAC but Member may request cancellation of Tokens, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whereupon the membership linked to such cancelled Tokens shall expire immediately and Member shall be entitled to no further rights and shall be subject to no further obligations in and under eosDAC with respect to said Tokens, save and except such rights and obligations accrued to Member to the date of cancellation of said Tokens.

7. During the Token Distribution, Tokens shall be distributed by BlockMaker Ltd in the following tranches::

(a) 75% to holders of EOS tokens as at 1:00 UTC on 15thApril 2018, on the basis of one (1) eosDAC token for each one (1) EOS token held by a person or entity in an account with balance in excess 100 EOS (or, upon request, with a balance of less than 100 EOS) ("Open Token Distribution").
Any tokens not distributed from this tranche shall be "burnt" thereby permanently removing same from circulation.

(b) 25% to launch team, advisors, community supporters and eosDAC Ltd.

8. Each Token shall constitute the holder thereof as a member of the eosDAC, entitled to all the benefits and subject to all the obligations set out in the Constitution.

9. The acceptance and holding of Tokens shall constitute the holder thereof as a member of the eosDAC in proportion to the number of Tokens held by such holder.
By accepting and holding a Token, Member is constituted as the holder of such Token and as a member of the eosDAC.

10. Beyond membership and automated governance of the eosDAC in accordance with its Constitution, a Token does not maintain, represent or enable any rights, uses, purpose, attributes, functionalities or features, express or implied.
Immediately upon transfer or cancellation of a Token, Member shall cease to be a member of the eosDAC to the extent of the Token transferred or cancelled.

11. A Token does not grant the holder thereof the right to any part of the share capital of BlockMaker Ltd, to any vote at any shareholders meeting of BlockMaker Ltd or to any voting rights with respect the appointment of directors or managers of BlockMaker Ltd.
Tokens are not being distributed by BlockMaker Ltd in exchange for or in expectation of any monetary or other consideration.
Tokens shall be non-refundable and non-redeemable.
Tokens are not, and are not intended to be an investment, security, commodity or any other financial instrument or investment.

12. Member expressly acknowledges and represents that it has carefully reviewed the T&C and fully understands the risks and benefits associated with the acceptance and holding of the Tokens.

Token Distribution Restrictions

13. No U.S. Persons:
The Tokens are not being and/or are not intended to be distributed to any S. Person, citizen, resident or entity ("Excluded Person") pursuant to the Open Token Distribution.
If any Excluded Person accepts or purports to accept any Tokens pursuant to the Open Token Distribution by BlockMaker Ltd, such person would have taken such action in an inapplicable, unauthorized and/or unlawful manner and the Tokens shall not be deemed as accepted by such Excluded Person.
Any Excluded Person who accepts Tokens pursuant to the Open Token Distribution shall be solely liable for any legal, regulatory, judicial or contractual consequences therefrom and shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless BlockMaker Ltd, eosDAC and any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, servants or agents, past, present or future, thereof (collectively "Indemnified EP") from any penalties, damages, losses, liability, costs or expenses, whether direct or indirect, consequential, compensatory, punitive, actual, exemplary, incidental or special and including without limitation any loss of business, revenues, profits, data, use, goodwill or other intangible losses (collectively, "EP Damages") arising out of or related to such Excluded Person's acceptance or purported acceptance of Tokens pursuant to the Open Token Distribution.

Knowledge Required

14. Member acknowledges and agrees that it has sufficient knowledge in technological, business and financial matters, including but not limited to sufficient understanding of blockchain, digital ledger technology, cryptographic tokens, digital assets, smart contracts, block production, storage mechanisms (including online or offline digital, token or cryptocurrencies wallets), blockchain based software systems and/or other matters set out in this T&C, to evaluate and render an informed decision as to the risks and merits of the acceptance of Tokens and further acknowledges and agrees that it is able to bear such risks including risk of loss of Tokens and/or any risks or rewards accrued by reason of holding such Tokens and/or membership of the eosDAC.
Member expressly acknowledges that it has obtained or procured sufficient information in order to make an informed decision as to whether or not to accept and hold Tokens.

15. Member shall ensure that it understands and has significant experience of cryptocurrencies, blockchain systems and services, and that it fully understands the risks and mechanisms associated with the Token and Token Distribution, as well as the risks and mechanisms related to the use and custody of cryptocurrencies and/or other representations utilizing distributed ledger technology.

16. Neither BlockMaker Ltd nor eosDAC shall be responsible for any loss of Tokens held by Member, or any situation rendering it impossible for Member to access Tokens, which may result from, by or through any actions or omissions of Member.

17. It shall be the sole responsibility of Member to implement and appropriate measures to secure access to (a) any device associated with Member in connection with the acceptance, holding and use of Tokens; (b) private keys to Member's blockchain wallet or account; and (c) any other username, password or other login or identifying credentials.
In the event that Member loses possession or control of Member's private keys or any device associated with Member's blockchain related account or is not able to otherwise provide Member's login or identifying credentials, Member may lose all of Member's Tokens and/or access to Member's blockchain related account.
Neither BlockMaker Ltd nor eosDAC shall be under any obligation to recover or replace any Tokens rendered inaccessible and/or disabled thereby, or to provide any other compensation or reimbursement to Member thereof.

18. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that (a) the acceptance and holding of Tokens may have tax and regulatory consequences for Member; (b) Member is solely responsible for Member's compliance with any such or any tax or regulatory consequences of Member linked to the acceptance and holding of Tokens and/or membership of the eosDAC; (c) Member shall have consulted with and taken advice from Member's own tax and regulatory professional prior to accepting and holding the Tokens; and (d) neither BlockMaker Ltd nor eosDAC bears any responsibility or liability to Member with respect to any tax or regulatory consequences linked to Member's acceptance and holding of Tokens and/or membership of the eosDAC.

Members Representation and Warranties

19. By accepting any Token, Member agrees to be bound by the T&C and in particular, Member represents and warrants that:

(a) It is authorized and has full power and authority to accept and hold the Token according to the laws that apply in Member's jurisdiction of domicile or other applicable jurisdiction;

(b) It is authorized and has full power to execute, deliver and be bound by the T&C and to carry out and perform its obligations thereunder;

(c) If an individual, it is at least 18 years old and of sufficient legal age and capacity to accept and hold the Tokens and, if a legal person, it is validly constituted and in good standing under the laws of its domicile and each jurisdiction in which it operates or conducts business;

(d) That the execution, delivery and performance of and by Member under the T&C requires no approval, authorization or other action from any governmental or regulatory authority or any other person, entity or bureau, whatsoever, other than Member;

(e) That the execution delivery and performance of and by Member under the T&C shall not, and will not in the future, result in any violation of, be in conflict with or constitute a material default under (i) any provision of Member's constitutional documents (if applicable), (ii) any provision of any judgment, order or decree to which Member is a party, by which Member is bound or to which Member's material assets are subject, (iii) any material agreement, obligation, duty or commitment to which Member is a party or is bound, or (iv) any laws, regulations, rules or contracts applicable to Member.

(f) It is not accepting and holding the Tokens for the purpose of any speculative investment;

(g) It will not use any Tokens for any illegal activity, 
including but not limited to money laundering and the financing of terrorism;

(h) It shall be responsible for determining whether the acceptance and holding of the Tokens is appropriate for it;

(i) It shall accept and hold the Tokens exclusively for usage in accordance with the Constitution of the eosDAC;

(j) It understands the risks associated with acceptance and holding of the Tokens (including but not limited to the risks related to the non-development of the eosDAC and its operations).

20. Upon request of or notification by BlockMaker Ltd or eosDAC, and from time to time, Member shall immediately provide information and documents that BlockMaker Ltd or eosDAC, in its or their sole discretion, deems necessary to comply with the laws, regulations, rules or agreements of or in relation to any applicable jurisdiction or blockchain, including but not limited to judicial decrees, order, processes or arbitral awards.
Such documents or information shall include, but not be limited to, certified copies of Member's passport, utility bills, government identification cards, sworn statements and information and documentation relating to persons or entities affiliated with Member.
Member expressly and irrevocably consents to the disclosure of such information and documentation, and the recording or making of copies thereof, required for compliance with any laws, regulations, rules or agreements of or in relation to any applicable jurisdiction or blockchain.
Failure by Member to comply with any such request for information or documentation may result in measures taken against such Member, including but not limited to the unregistering of such Member as a member the eosDAC.

21. By accepting and holding any Tokens, Member represents and warrants that, to the extent required by any applicable law, Member complies with all anti-money laundering and prevention of terrorism rules, regulations and procedures and neither Member nor any person for whom Member is acting as agent or nominee in relation to the Tokens is subject to any sanctions administered or enforced by any government or regulatory body, or is organized or resident in any country or territory that is subject to any country or territory wide sanctions by any government or regulatory body, or is a politically exposed person.

Risks

22. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that acceptance and holding of Tokens and storage thereof involves various risks and Member accepts the Tokens and membership of the eosDAC subject to such risks, as set out in the T&C and otherwise, without any claim, right or remedy that Member may otherwise have at law, equity or otherwise, including but not limited to any claims for compensation, damages, refunds or redemptions, against BlockMaker Ltd, eosDAC or any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parents, subsidiary, affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof.

23. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees to the risk that eosDAC may not be able to launch its network, develop its operations and/or provide any benefits to Member and, accordingly, prior to acceptance of Tokens, Member confirms that it has considered the risks, costs, and benefits of acceptance of Tokens, the Token Distribution, the T&C and membership of the eosDAC, and, if necessary, shall have obtained any and all independent and professional advice in this regard.

24. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that Tokens and/or membership of the eosDAC shall, beyond such benefits set out in the Constitution, have no rights, uses, purpose, attributes, functionalities or features express or implied.

25. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that all matters set out in the T&C, Constitution and Website are new and untested and that the eosDAC and related technology may not be capable of completion, implementation or adoption and, even if the eosDAC and related technology is completed, implemented and adopted, it may not function as intended and/or many not have the functionality that is necessary or desirable and/or may become outdated and/or may be subject to technical errors and delays.

26. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that the software associated with the eosDAC is under development, may undergo significant modifications over time and new related or replacement software may be developed from time to time and such development and modifications may result in added or reduced features to those set forth in this T&C, the Constitution and/or the Website.

27. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that the development of the eosDAC and related software may be abandoned for a number of reasons including but not limited to lack of interest from Members or potential Members, lack of funding, lack of prospects or the departure of valuable personnel and technicians related to or utilized by the eosDAC.

28. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that Tokens may be or become non-transferrable following Member's acceptance of Tokens pursuant to the Token Distribution or thereafter, whether by reason of the Constitution or by technical error or inability, and/or may not be tradable on any exchanges.

29. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that the following further risks relate to the governance and/or operations of the Tokens and eosDAC::

(a) Strong competition resulting in difficulty of eosDAC being voted/appointed as a main block producer of EOS blockchain;

(b) Insufficient capacity to effectively implement activity and decisions of the eosDAC;

(c) Crypto market crash and/or low EOS token inflation resulting in token payments being insufficient to cover operating costs of eosDAC;

(d) Governance of eosDAC being subject to the control by small self interested groups;

(e) DDoS or "flood attacks";

(f) Regulatory and Legal threats;

(g) Inappropriate content on EOS blockchain;

(h) Governance paralysis or other inability to reach quorum or effect governance decisions;

(i) Difficulties arising from use of block production revenue to pay for infrastructure including but not limited to difficulties in exchange of EOS tokens for fiat currency;

(j) Delays in implementation of EOSIO software.

30. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that the regulatory status of decentralized autonomous communities, cryptographic tokens, digital assets, blockchain technology and distributed ledger technology is unsettled and/or unclear in many jurisdictions, and it is difficult to predict how or whether international, governmental, regulatory and judicial authorities will regulate such technologies and organizations and how or whether such international, governmental, regulatory and judicial authorities may interpret or modify existing laws, regulations or rules that affect such matters.
Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that such interpretation or modification may have adverse consequences to the Tokens, and their holders and usage thereof, and the eosDAC; such interpretations and modifications including but not limited to characterizing the Tokens as regulated financial instruments or characterizing the eosDAC as a regulated investment vehicle. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees the eosDAC may cease operations in any jurisdiction, and discontinue membership of any persons residing or affected by any jurisdiction, in the event that the laws or regulations in such jurisdictions render it unlawful or commercially undesirable to maintain any link with such jurisdictions.

31. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that the embryonic nature of decentralized autonomous communities, cryptographic tokens, digital assets, blockchain technology and distributed ledger technology may result in increased and/or disproportionate oversight and scrutiny from international, governmental, regulatory and judicial authorities with respect the Tokens and/or the eosDAC (or persons or entities related to or interacting therewith) and that there can be no assurance that such authorities will not examine same or pursue investigatory, enforcement, compliance or other actions against the Tokens or the eosDAC and members thereof (or persons or entities related thereto or interacting therewith).
Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that such actions may subject the eosDAC and/or its members to judgments, settlements, fines or penalties and/or may cause the eosDAC to restructure the organization and the benefits and obligations thereunder and lead to damage to the eosDAC's reputation, operational costs or effectiveness.

Important Disclaimers

32. The T&C, Website, Token Distribution and membership of the eosDAC are not intended to, and shall not, be considered as an invitation to any person enter into an investment and are not intended to, and do not, constitute or relate in any way as an offering of securities in any jurisdiction.
Neither the T&C nor the Website includes or contains any information that may or should be considered a recommendation or that may be used as a basis for any investment decision.

33. Any information in the T&C or Website is given for general information purpose only and neither BlockMaker Ltd nor eosDAC r any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parent, subsidiary affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof, shall be construed as providing any representation or warranty as to the accuracy and completeness of such information.

34. The Tokens are not, and are not intended to be, shares or securities of any type and do not entitle the holder thereof to any ownership or other interest in BlockMaker Ltd or any person or entity related thereto, and are merely the representation of the holder's entitlement to membership of the eosDAC and the means by which the governance of the eosDAC is effect.

35. Neither the T&C nor the Website contains, or should be considered to, contain any representations, warranties, promises or guarantees, express, implied or statutory, arising or related to the Tokens or the eosDAC and same are expressly disclaimed, including but not limited to any representations, warranties, promises or guarantees, express, implied or statutory, relating to title, non infringement, merchantability, usage, suitability or fitness for any particular purpose, or as to workmanship or technology (including technical coding), or the absence of any defects, whether latent or patent.

36. By accepting Tokens, Member accepts the T&C, including but not limited to the waiver by Member of any claim, right or remedy that Member may otherwise have at law, equity or otherwise, against BlockMaker Ltd, eosDAC and any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parent, subsidiary affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof, arising out of or related to the usage of the Token or the membership of the eosDAC, save and except with respect to the benefits and obligations expressly set out in the Constitution.

37. eosDAC shall use best endeavours to develop, launch and carry out the decentralized autonomous community, the software and blockchain tokens to enable membership of the decentralized autonomous community, effect automated governance thereof and the operations of the decentralized autonomous community, all as described in the Constitution and the Website.
There is, however, no guarantee (and any such guarantee is expressly disclaimed by the T&C) that such decentralized autonomous community, software and blockchain token and/or operations shall be successfully delivered or realized as described in this T&C, the Constitution or the Website, or at all.
Member acknowledges, understands and agrees to said risks, and further, to the fullest extent permitted by law, and in relation to same, expressly waives, relinquishes and releases, as against BlockMaker Ltd, eosDAC and any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parent, subsidiary affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof (collectively "Disclaimed Parties"), any claim, right or remedy that Member may otherwise have at law, equity or otherwise.

38. To the fullest extent permitted by law, and except as otherwise expressly stated in this T&C, the Disclaimed Parties disclaim any representations, warranties, promises or guarantees arising out of or related to BlockMaker Ltd, the Token Distribution, the Website, the Tokens and/or membership of the eosDAC, the eosDAC, and further, to the fullest extent permitted by law, and in relation to same, Member expressly waives, relinquishes and releases, as against the Disclaimed Parties, any claim, right or remedy that Member may otherwise have at law, equity or otherwise.

39. Member expressly acknowledges, understands and agrees that it is accepting and holding the Tokens and maintaining membership of the eosDAC, at Member's sole risk and that same are provided to, and used and acquired by, Member on an "AS IS" and "AS AVAILABLE" basis without any representations, warranties, promises or guarantees whatsoever by the Disclaimed Parties and Member shall have relied on its own examinations and investigations thereof and further, to the fullest extent permitted by law, and in relation to same, Member expressly waives, relinquishes and releases, as against the Disclaimed Parties, any claim, right or remedy that Member may otherwise have at law, equity or otherwise.

40. Member expressly acknowledges, understands and agrees that eosDAC may be considered an unincorporated association and, notwithstanding any provisions of the T&C or Constitution, any liabilities incurred by or attributed to the eosDAC may be considered as the unlimited liabilities of each Member of the eosDAC, jointly or severally.

Limitation of Liability

41. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, neither BlockMaker Ltd, eosDAC nor any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parent, subsidiary affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof ("Released Parties"), assumes any liability or responsibility for any loss arising or related to the Token Distribution or any transfer or assignment of Tokens, or any technical, interruption or malfunction of thereof.

42. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, Member disclaims any right or cause of action against the Released Parties, of any kind and in any jurisdiction, that would give rise to any damages, losses, liabilities, costs or expenses of any kind, whether direct or indirect, consequential, compensatory, incidental, actual, exemplary, punitive or special and including, without limitation, any loss of business, revenues, profits, data, use, goodwill or other intangible losses (collectively, "Damages") whatsoever, on the part of any of the Released Parties.
Each of the Released Parties shall not be liable to Member for any type of Damages, even if and notwithstanding the extent any of the Released Parties has been advised of the possibility of such Damages.
Member agrees not to seek any refund, compensation or reimbursement from any of the Released Parties, regardless of the reason, and regardless of whether the reason is identified in the T&C.

43. Without prejudice to the foregoing, in no circumstances shall the aggregate liability of the Released Parties, whether in contract, warrant, tort or other theory, for Damages to Member under this T&C exceed the amount of monetary value received by BlockMaker Ltd or eosDAC (if any) in exchange for the Member's acceptance and holding of the Tokens pursuant to the Token Distribution.

44. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that none of the Released Parties shall be liable, and such Released Parties disclaim all liability to Member, in connection with any force majeure event, including acts of God, labour disputes or other industrial disturbances, electrical, telecommunications, hardware, software or other utility failures, software or smart contract bugs or weaknesses, earthquakes, storms, or other nature-related events, blockages, embargoes, riots, acts or orders of government, acts of terrorism or war, technological change, changes in interest rates or other monetary conditions, and, for the avoidance of doubt, changes to any blockchain-related technology.

45. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, Member releases the Released Parties from any and all responsibility, liability, claims, demands, and/or Damages of every kind and nature, known and unknown (including, but not limited to, claims of negligence), including but not limited to claims arising out of or related to disputes between Member and the acts or omissions of third parties, save and except with respect to the benefits and obligations expressly set out in the Constitution. 
:

46. Indemnification:
To the fullest extent permitted by any applicable law, Member shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless and reimburse the Released Parties from and against any and all actions, proceedings, claims, Damages, demands and actions (including without limitation fees and expenses of counsel), incurred by any of the Released Parties arising from or relating to: (i) Member's acceptance or use of Tokens; (ii) Member's responsibilities or obligations under the T&C; (iii) Member's breach of or violation of the T&C; (iv) any inaccuracy in any representation or warranty of Member; (v) Member's violation of any rights of any other person or entity; and/or (vi) any act or omission of Member that is negligent, unlawful or constitutes willful misconduct.
The Released Parties, or any of them, reserve the right to exercise sole control over the defense, at Member's expense, of any claim subject to indemnification hereunder.
This indemnity is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other indemnities set forth in the T&C and/or Constitution.

Transfer of Tokens

47. Member acknowledges, understands and agrees that Tokens shall be transferable, and membership of the eosDAC assignable upon transfer of Tokens, in the manner set out in the Constitution.

48. As at the date of transfer of the Tokens, as determined in accordance with the Constitution, the transferee thereof shall be entitled and subject to all unrealized benefits and obligations accruing to or with respect to the Tokens or in the membership of the eosDAC at such date and all benefits and obligations thereafter, and the transferor shall, as at said date of transfer and thereafter, cease to be entitled or subject to any benefits or obligations with respect to the transferred Tokens, or in the membership of the eosDAC.

49. As at the date of transfer of Tokens, the transferee thereof shall, upon acceptance and holding of such Tokens, be bound by the terms and conditions of the T&C.

Entire Agreement and Severability

50. This T&C, including any exhibits attached hereto and the materials incorporated herein by reference, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous agreements and understandings, both written and oral, between such parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, including, without limitation, any public or other statements or presentations made by any of BlockMaker Ltd, eosDAC or any member, employee, officer, director, consultant, advisor, parent, subsidiary affiliate, servant or agent, past, present or future, thereof.

51. If any of the provisions of this T&C are deemed to be invalid, void or unenforceable under applicable law, the remaining provisions shall continue in full force and effect.

Electronic Communications

52. Member agrees and acknowledges that all agreements, notices, disclosures and other communications provided to Member pursuant to the T&C or in relation to Member's acceptance and holding of Tokens, including but not limited Member's acceptance and holding of Tokens pursuant to the Token Distribution, may be provided to Member in electronic form.

Applicable Law

53. The governing law for the purposes only of the interpretation and construction of the provisions of the T&C, and the contractual relations created thereby, shall be the laws of Anguilla.

Dispute Resolution

54. Informal Dispute Resolution:
Member shall cooperate in good faith to resolve any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, relating to or in connection with the T&C, including with respect to the formation, applicability, breach, termination, validity or enforceability thereof ("Dispute").
If the parties to any Dispute are unable to resolve a Dispute within ninety (90) days of notice of such Dispute being received by all parties thereof, such Dispute shall be finally settled by Binding Arbitration, as defined hereinafter.

55. Binding Arbitration:
Any Dispute not resolved within 90 days as set forth hereinbefore shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) rules in effect at the time of the arbitration, except as they may be modified herein or by mutual agreement of the parties to such arbitration.
The number of arbitrators shall be one who shall be selected by the parties to the arbitration.
The seat, or legal place, of arbitration shall be London, England.
The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be English.
The governing law of the T&C, for the purposes only of the interpretation and constructions of the provisions of the Constitution, and the contractual relations created thereby, shall be the laws of Anguilla.
The arbitration award shall be final and binding on the parties thereto ("Binding Arbitration").
Member undertakes to carry out any award without delay and waive its right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.
Judgment upon the award may be entered by any court having jurisdiction thereof or having jurisdiction over the relevant party or its assets.
Without prejudice to any indemnification provision of the T&C, each party to arbitration shall pay their respective attorneys' fees and expenses.

56. No Class Arbitrations, Class Actions or Representative Actions:
Any dispute arising out of or related to the T&C shall be personal to the parties to the arbitration and shall not be brought as a class arbitration, class action or any other type of representative proceeding.
There shall be no class arbitration or arbitration in which an individual attempts to resolve a dispute as a representative of another individual or group of individuals.

57. The provisions of the T&C relating to Dispute Resolution shall become operational only in the event that the relevant dispute does not fall within the ambit and/or jurisdiction of the dispute resolution provisions set out in the Constitution of the eosDAC.
To the extent that any dispute falls within the ambit and/or jurisdiction of the Constitution of the eosDAC, whether exclusively or concurrently with the T&C, Member shall first and exclusively seek dispute resolution pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of the Constitution.

vision of eosDAC

description::
"It is the vision of eosDAC that EOS.IO block production should be open for everyone to contribute and benefit. To realise this vision, eosDAC is an evolving Decentralised Autonomous Community (DAC) focused on EOS.IO Block Production serving the EOS communities worldwide. In doing this, eosDAC is creating the tools and smart contracts it needs to function. It will share these with the EOS communities to help other DACs thrive on the EOS.IO blockchains."
[https://eosdac.io/why-join/]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'vision,

core-principles of eosDAC

description::
"2.2.1 Nurturing the Ecosystem:
The primary objective of the DAC shall be to nurture and support the EOSIO ecosystem
2.2.2 Excellence of Service:
DAC shall always strive to ensure that it is able to produce or procure the continuous production of blocks required by EOSIO software driven blockchains.
2.2.3 Openness and Transparency:
All decisions made by the DAC governance structures and all operations of the DAC will be open and transparent.
2.2.4 Support of EOSIO Communities Worldwide:
DAC shall engage with the communities, listen and support projects that benefit all EOSIO blockchain communities.
2.2.5 Fairness:
DAC shall treat all members fairly, reward contributions appropriately and not seek unmerited profits.
No one member should have less information about a decision than others.
2.2.6 Independence:
DAC will not seek any stake in, or exert undue influence over, other block producers and shall take appropriate measures to protect its own independence.
2.2.7 Respect of the EOS Constitution:
DAC shall respect the EOS blockchain(s) on which the DAC operates:
To the extent that each EOSIO blockchain, for which DAC produces or procures continuous production of blocks, will have its own constitution or equivalent organizational instrument, DAC shall use its best efforts to adhere to such constitutions or organizational documents whilst acting in the interest of all chain token holders."
[Constitution]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'core-principles,

custodian-board of eosDAC

description::
"1.5 Custodian Board: or "Board" means the representative and governance board of the DAC that, save and except for the Genesis Board, shall consist of a maximum of twelve (12) persons appointed by the Members in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, which Custodian Board shall be first constituted upon the transfer of the DAC Tokens onto an EOSIO blockchain and the initialization of a voting Dapp, and which Board shall have such powers and duties as are set out in the Constitution"
[Costitution 1.5]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'board!⇒eosDAC-board,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'custodian-board!⇒eosDAC-board,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-board, {2019-05-19},

custodian of Board (link)

committee of Board

description::
"7.12 The Custodian Board may, by a Resolution, designate one or more committees, each consisting of one or more Custodians to do such things, make such investigations or inquiries and make such reports as determined by the Custodian Board by Resolution."
[Constitution]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-board'committee,

record of Board

description::
"7.10 The Custodian Board may, by Resolution, cause the following records ("Records") to be kept:
7.10.1 minutes of any meetings of Custodians;
7.10.2 copies of all Resolutions, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolutions by the Custodian Board; and
7.10.3 such other accounts and records as the Custodian Board considered necessary or desirable inorder to reflect the financial position of the Custodian Board or DAC."
[Constitution]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-board'record,

publication-on-blockchain of Board

description::
"7.8 Immediately upon determination of any matter by Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution, the Custodian Board shall publish on the blockchain (a) whether or not the matter has been approved or rejected by Resolution, Special Resolution or Extraordinary Resolution (b) the number of votes in favour and against in reaching such determination and (c) the vote of each Custodian with respect to such Proposal."
[Constitution 7.8]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'publication,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-board'publication,

members-referendum-proposal of Board

description::
"7.13 The Custodian Board may, but shall not be required to, by Special Resolution determine, from time to time, that specific issues substantially affecting or capable of substantially affecting the DAC shall be put before the DAC for determination by vote of Members ("Members Referendum Proposal")."
[Constitution 7.13]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'members-referendum-proposal,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-board'members-referendum-proposal,

nomination-directive of eosDAC

description::
"1.14 Nomination Directive: means rules and regulations, approved by Special Resolution, as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, prescribing the procedure, qualifications (including staking) and mechanism for the nomination, election and appointment of Custodians to the Custodian Board"
[Constitution 1.14]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'nomination-directive,

resolution of eosDAC

description::
"1.19 Resolution: means a resolution, determination or decision consented to by a majority of Custodians of the Custodian Board casting votes on such resolution, determination or decision"
[Constitution 1.19]
===
"7.7 Unless otherwise stated in the Constitution or any Voting Directive, from time to time, all matters for determination by the Custodian Board shall be determined by simple Resolution."
[Constitution 7.7]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'resolution,

special-resolution of eosDAC

description::
"1.20 Special Resolution: means a resolution, determination or decision consented to by not less than 75% of Custodians of the Custodian Board casting votes on such resolution, determination or decision"
[Constitution 1.20]
===
· 9 of 12 custodians or the "med" permission.

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'special-resolution,

extraordinary-resolution of eosDAC

description::
"1.10 Extraordinary Resolution: means a resolution, determination or decision consented to by not less than 83% of the Custodians constituting the Custodian Board casting votes on such resolution, determination or decision"
[Constitution 1.10]
===
· 10 out of 12 custodians or "high" permission.

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'extraordinary-resolution,

proposal of eosDAC

description::
"1.16 Proposal: means a proposal submitted by a Member to the Custodian Board for consideration and determination by the Custodian Board, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and shall include but not be limited to proposals on bounties, technical choices, services providers, contingency levels and allocations of tokens raised through block production by or through the DAC"
[Costitution 1.16]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'proposal,

proposal-directive of eosDAC

description::
"1.18 Proposal Directive: means rules and regulations, approved by Special Resolution, as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, prescribing the subject matter of, and the procedure, qualifications and mechanism for, the submission of Proposals by Members or Custodians to the Custodian Board for their consideration and determination"
[Constitution 1.18]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'proposal-directive,

info-resource of proposal

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-proposal'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://github.com/eosdac/eosdac-contracts/tree/master/dacproposals,

transparency of eosDAC

description::
"11.1 All decisions, transactions and/or accounting for the DAC shall be viewable by all Members on the Website and/or on the blockchain hosting the DAC."
[Constitution-v4 11.1]
===
"In a DAC, not just the code is open source - financials, hiring, workflow systems, team meetings and more must be transparent so that all token participants can contribute and audit."
[https://steemit.com/eosdac/@eosdac/eosdac-announces-first-approved-worker-proposals-prioritising-block-production-and-dac-toolkit]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'transparency,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-govc'transparency,

member-client of eosDAC

description::
"When completed, this member client will allow you to read the constitution, register as a member, submit worker proposals, register as a custodian candidate, vote on custodians, transfer tokens, and more."
[https://members.eosdac.io/]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'member-client,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-govc'member-client,

info-resource of govc

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC-govc'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* {2018-12-15} https://steemit.com/eosio/@eosdac/eosdac-prepares-transition-arrangements-into-custodian-governance,
* {2018-12-15} https://steemit.com/eosdac/@eosdac/eosdac-custodian-candidate-voting-is-live,

voting-directive of eosDAC

description::
"1.25 Voting Directive: means rules and regulations, approved by Special Resolution, as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, prescribing the subject matter of (where applicable), and the procedure, qualifications and mechanism for, voting by Members and Custodians, including but not limited to quorums, consensus and staking of DAC Tokens"
[Constitution 1.25]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'voting-directive,

accounting of eosDAC

description::
"12.1 The Custodian Board may, but shall not be required to, call for the accounts to be examined by auditors and upon such terms and conditions, including appointment of auditors, as the Custodian Board may determinate by Special Resolution."
[Constitution-v4 12.1]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'accounting,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-govc'accounting,

DAC-Factory of eosDAC

description::
"In order to function, DACs need tools that aren’t currently available.
eosDAC has created these tools and, through its commitment to open source software, will share them as a “DAC Factory” that anyone can take and use to set up and run a DAC.
The DAC Factory will evolve organically and over time and will include the core concepts of membership, voting, custodians, and proposals. Any account holding EOSDAC tokens can become a Member and get rights to benefit from the DAC, stand as a custodian, vote for custodians and submit proposals. Custodians are the DAC decision makers and will be continually voted for and held accountable by members. Proposals will be voted for by custodians and once approved (subject to available funds being available) will be implemented, checked and paid for. All proposals will provide some deliverables and benefits to the DAC ecosystem.
The DAC Factory will need to make sure that all of the different cogs of the DAC machine run smoothly.
Over time, other DAC structures and tools could be supported. It is also envisaged that other individuals, groups, and DACs will join and build upon the tools we create. Beyond software, the DAC Factory will also include best practices alongside legal and regulatory guidance for different jurisdictions. This will include a case study on eosDAC’s endeavors."
[https://eosdac.io/history/]

name::
* McsEngl.DAC-Factory--of--eosDAC-Dong,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'DAC-Factory,
* McsEngl.eosDAC-Factory,

addressWpg::
* https://github.com/eosdac/eosdac-factory,
* {2019-03-27} https://steemit.com/dac/@eosdac/the-dac-factory,
* {2019-03-19} The DAC Factory: Scripts for Launching Your Own DAC on EOS, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=12&v=dtFZjJ1409M,

smart-contract of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'smart-contract,

addressWpg::
* https://github.com/eosdac/eosdac-contracts: All the EOSDAC smart contracts,

DAC-Chain-Initiative of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'DAC-Chain-Initiative,

addressWpg::
* {2018-08-30} https://steemit.com/eosdac/@eosdac/the-dac-chain-initiative-announcing-an-exploratory-into-how-usage-of-eos-side-chains-and-separate-chains-may-create-benefits-for,

organization of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'organization,

DAC-Foundation

description::
"The DAC Foundation can support projects aligned with its purpose on any chain. We’re cognisant that currently, the EOS.IO software is unique in being sophisticated enough to encode and transact the complex relationships needed to run a DAC.
DACs need to run on a blockchain that can support smart contracts – so a DAC could not run on bitcoin.
Beyond smart contracts, editable smart contracts are needed, since a complex functional organisational needs to be able to iterate its systems and processes over time. Ethereum allows for smart contracts but not editable smart contracts.
We’re happy to hear from you if you are DAC/DAO project on any chain that can support a DAC."
[https://dac.foundation/index.html#header4-n]

name::
* McsEngl.DAC-Foundation,
* McsEngl.eosDAC'DAC-Foundation,

addressWpg::
* {2018-12-14} https://steemit.com/eosio/@eosdac/eosdac-announce-the-formation-of-the-dac-foundation,

law of eosDAC

description::
"a decentralised autonomous community - an entity not yet recognised in law -"
[https://members.eosdac.io/profile/greentreesom]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'law,

info-resource of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'Infrsc,

addressWpg::
* https://eosdac.io/,
* https://github.com/eosdac,
* https://steemit.com/@eosdac,
* http://discord.io/eosdac,
* https://www.youtube.com/EOSDAC,
* https://twitter.com/eosdac,
*
* https://eosdac.io/success-stories/: eosDAC is providing advice and assistance to DAC projects,
=== news:
* https://eosdac.io/news/,
* {2019-05-16} https://steemit.com/eosio/@eosdac/why-eosdac-deserves-eos-bp-support-updated,
* {2019-05-02} https://steemit.com/dac/@lukestokes/working-with-the-dac-it-s-not-personal,
* {2018-06-18} Andrew-Furmanczyk, What is a DAC? - Explained, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahoFGzxE_NY,
* {2018-03-26} Calling all EOS Token Holders - Get Ready for the eosDAC Snapshot: https://steemit.com/eos/@eosdac/,
* {2018-03-05} https://steemit.com/eos/@eosdac/introducing-eosdac-the-community-owned-eos-block-producer,

website of eosDAC

description::
· https://eosdac.io/

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'website,

DOING of eosDAC

todo of eosDAC

description::
"Here's what eosDAC needs to do (in my opinion)
1. Keep running as a high quality block producer
2. Get the worker proposal system working on chain
3. Get new sources of profitable revenue
4. Keep existing developers and bring on board new developers
5. Look at ways to build value for the EOS community
6. Work towards a DAC focused eosio chain
7. Exercise prudent/efficient control of funds and reserves"
[https://members.eosdac.io/profile/spaceinvader]

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'todo,

EVOLUTING of eosDAC

name::
* McsEngl.eosDAC'evoluting,

{2018-12-14}::
=== DAC-Foundation creation:
[https://steemit.com/eosio/@eosdac/eosdac-announce-the-formation-of-the-dac-foundation]

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